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droit maritime: Supplément à la 8e édition : Les décrets-lois de 1934 et de 1935 concernant le 
droit commercial. Paris: A. Rousseau. 
 
Articles  
Benedettelli, M. & Sabatini, M. (2015). Public policy and Italian law of international 
arbitration. ARBLIT, Radicati di Brozolo, Italy.  
Benito (de), M. & Elizalde (de), F. (unknown). Exequatur and Public Policy. IE University, 
Madrid/Segovia. 
Bernstein, L. (2009). Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry. Economics of Commercial Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 251-293. 
Bernstein, L., & University of Chicago. (2001). Private commercial law in the cotton industry: 
Creating cooperation through rules, norms, and institutions. Chicago, Ill.: Law School, 
University of Chicago. 
Bond, S. R. (1991). The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 12, 1, 1-22. 
Bourdeau, M. (2014) L'idée d'ordre spontané ou le monde selon Hayek. Archives de 
Philosophie, 77 (4), pp.663-678. 
Brekoulakis, S. (2008). Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Observations on the 
Efficiency of the Current System and the Gradual Development of Alternative Means of 
Enforcement. The American Review of International Arbitration, 19, 415-446. 
Charny, D. (1990). Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships. Harvard Law Review, 
104(2), 373-467. 
Chen, H. & Howes, B. T. (2009). The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in China. 
Bloomberg Law Reports – Asia Pacific. Available at: 
http://files.mwe.com/info/pubs/BLR_1109.pdf  - Consulted May 2017.  
------------------------------ (2010). “Public policy” and the enforcement of foreign arbitration 
awards in China. Available at: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f96e8738-5cfe-
4e39-8d1d-7a6dbfbd4c21  - Consulted May 2017. 
Chukwumerije, O. (1999). Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English 
Arbitration Act of 1996. Arbitration International, 15, 2, 171-192. 
Cuniberti, G. (2007). The French Like It Delocalized: Lex Non Facit Arbitrum. Available at: 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/the-french-like-it-delocalized-lex-non-facit-arbitrum/ - 
Consulted May 2017. 
VIII 
 
Di Robilant, A. (2006). Genealogies of Soft Law. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
54(3), 499-554.  
Drahozal, C. R. (2009). Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration. Dickinson 
Law Review, 113, 4, 1031. 
--------------------------- Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law 
Merchant (July, 18 2011). Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2005. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1888583 Consulted May 2017. 
--------------------------- Empirical Findings on International Arbitration: An Overview (2016). 
Oxford Handbook on International Arbitration (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888552 Consulted April 2017.  
 
Dupret, B. (2007). Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices. European Journal 
of Legal Studies, 1, 1. 
Earl S. W. (1934). The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration , 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
132. Available at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol83/iss2/2 - Consulted 
April 2017. 
Freyer, D. H., & Gharavi, H. G. (January 01, 1998). Finality and enforceability of foreign 
arbitral awards: From "double exequatur" to the enforcement of annulled awards : a suggested 
path to uniformity amidst diversity. Icsid Review : Foreign Investment Law Journal, 13, 1, 101-
123. 
Gaillard, E. (January 01, 2010). Three Philosophies of International Arbitration. Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation : the Fordham Papers, 2009, 305-310. 
García, E. J. (1990). The role of public policy in international commercial arbitration. Law and 
Policy in International Business, 213, 389-440. 
Goode, R. (2001). The role of the lex loci arbitri in international commercial arbitration. 
Arbitration International : the Journal of Lcia Worldwide Arbitration, 17, 1, 19-39. 
Grewal, D. S. & Purdy, J. (2015) Law and Neoliberalism. Law and Contemporary Problems, 
77, 1-23. 
Hollander, P. (unknown). Belgium & EU. Hanotiau & van den Berg, Brussels. Available at: 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=661247ED-6C08-4575-
8DDA-6AE4E849CEA6 - Consulted May 2017. 
Hourwich, I. (1915). The Evolution of Commercial Law. American Bar Association Journal, 
1(2), 70-76. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25699734 -Consulted May 2017. 
Kelsen, H., & Knight, M. (2009). Pure theory of law. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange. 
Lalive, P. (1984). Enforcing Awards. International Arbitration : 60 Years of Icc Arbitration : a 
Look at the Future, 317-359.  
IX 
 
------------(1987). Transnational (or truly international) public policy and international 
arbitration. Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration : [viiith 
International Arbitration Congress, New York, 6-9 May 1986]. 
Lew, J. D. M. (2006). Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration. Arbitration 
International: The Journal of LCIA Worldwide Arbitration, 22, 2, 179-203.  
Park, W. W. (2001). Why courts review arbitral awards. Law of International Business and 
Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century : Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel Anlässlich 
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1  !Introduction 
1.1 Topical issue 
DO YOU dream? When do you dream? What do you dream about? Do you 
dream about international arbitration? Is there a dream for international 
arbitration? Is the concept of delocalised arbitration, or arbitration not 
controlled by national law, a dream or nightmare? Is autonomous arbitration 
a reality, or is 'every arbitration necessarily ... a national arbitration, that is 
to say, subject to a specific system of national law'?1 
This is how an article in favour of autonomous arbitration looks like. It seems a bit too lyrical 
for a tough topic like international commercial arbitration (hereinafter ‘ICA’). However, 
scholars of ICA dream of an autonomous arbitration and some express it in the same terms in 
order to combat this dream. The dream is clear: the creation of an autonomous international 
commercial arbitration system which would not have to rely on the State to work properly. 
Hence, this dreamed system would keep its own virtue in terms of time, cost, speed, efficiency, 
and neutrality and would be able to be self-enforced and would not need any State support. It 
is the dream of private ordering, the adjudication counterpart of lex mercatoria. 
This dream is also the one which appeared with neoliberalism and its extreme version of 
“laissez-faire”: deregulation and privatization. This idea is one which pushes the State to give 
away its role in economy and commerce while it focuses on security and financial stability. 
This dream is also the counterpart of the competition state.2 The concept of welfare state is 
ending and the notion of competition appears as fashionable. In order to achieve this 
transformation, the State must let private companies to do their best self-regulation. 
This dream appears also as a product of globalization. Companies are globalizing so quickly 
and widely that States are not appearing as the correct scale to deal with. It seems like the State 
is overwhelmed by the complexity of ICA matters. The scale of the State does not correspond 
to the reality of the multinational corporations which are making commerce in one state and 
arbitrating their disputes in another one. As a former French Prime Minister said, “L’État ne 
peux pas tout3” and that’s why this dream occurs. 
                                                 
1 Julian D.M. Lew (2006). 
2 Cutler, A.C. (2003) 
3 BUSINESS INSIDER. “The State cannot do everything” (author’s translation). This sentence created a small-
scale scandal in France. Indeed, France is a powerful and centralized country where it was thought that the State 
had no limits. 
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1.1 Definition of the terms 
The concept of international commercial arbitration will be defined in this section in order to 
understand what is going to be dealt through the whole thesis. How could ICA be distinguished 
from national arbitration law and from other types of dispute resolution?  
 
1.1.1 International 
The international feature of arbitration refers to its difference from national or domestic 
arbitration, it “transcends national boundaries”.4 This feature is controversial and here is a 
summary of the debate. Scholars thought that all arbitrations were domestic arbitrations because 
it happens in a specific country and it must follow substantive law of the seat of arbitration. 
However, the opponents to this traditional view supported the idea of a different arbitration 
which was less connected to the lex fori and having different features from national arbitration. 
Redfern and Hunter consider in their book that ICA is not related as much to its seat. Indeed, 
the place (‘seat’ meaning a real connection to the country) of arbitration is chosen mainly 
because of its neutrality. This choice is made in order for the place of arbitration not to take so 
much importance in arbitration proceedings and not to become a ‘seat’5. This debate concerning 
the existence of international arbitration has been solved by the adoption of the term of 
‘international commercial arbitration” by international instruments. International instruments 
are not the sole to use it. Indeed, a lot of countries have special laws for international 
commercial arbitration. However, there still remain scholars who would think that international 
arbitration refers only to state-to-state or investment arbitrations.6  
 
Once used by international instruments, this designation came with criteria establishing the 
internationality of the arbitration. To this regard, article 1(3) of Model Law can be reviewed7. 
In this article, there are three criteria for discovering an international arbitration: internationality 
                                                 
4 Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Redfern, A., & Hunter, M. (2015). p. 8 
5 Ibidem.  
6 Rubino-Sammartano, M. (2001). p. 46 
7 “(3) An arbitration is international if:  
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclu- sion of that agreement, their places of 
business in different States; or  
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which  
the parties have their places of business:  
1. (i)  the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement;  
2. (ii)  any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be 
performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely con- nected; or  
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than 
one country.” 
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arising out from the parties, from the dispute or from the choice of the parties.8 These elements 
are encompassing a lot of cases in order to consider proceedings which goes beyond the control 
of a sole country. The perfect example is a dispute between two parties from the same country 
performing a contract in another country. If the nationality of the disputants was the sole 
criterion, this would be missed even though this case is truly international. 
 
1.1.2 Commercial 
The term commercial is an important part of the definition because of the lack of national 
consensus on arbitrable matters. Indeed, a lot of subject matters can be arbitrated in the world 
but it differs from state to state. Some States are quite conservative and would allow solely 
commercial matters to be arbitrable. For example, Article 1 of the 1923 Geneva Protocol states 
the scope of the Protocol being commercial matters but also arbitrable matters in the concerned 
State. At the same time, it recognizes a possible reservation made by States to limit the 
application of this Protocol to only commercial matters. Commercial matters are the ones which 
are naturally included in international instruments while the other ones can be limited by State 
Parties by making a reservation that will limit the application of the concerned Convention. 
Article 1(3) of the New York Convention allows also for such a reservation. However, this 
procedure does not refer to any kind of definition of commercial matters that could be arbitrated. 
This lack of definition in the term ‘commercial’ is showed in the Model Law established by 
UNIDROIT. There, it is obvious that the “Model Law does not provide a strict definition of the 
term ‘commercial’9”. Though, a non-exhaustive list of commercial matters is included but it 
does not in any way give a closed concept of the term ‘commercial’. For this reason, 
international instruments are not useful in order to know whether it will be international 
commercial arbitration or not: national laws are the ones that are responsible to determine what 
embodies commercial matters that can be brought to arbitration.  
 
1.1.3 Arbitration 
Concerning the definition of arbitration, it is presented as a simple concept by Redfern and 
Hunter: “parties who are in dispute agree to submit their disagreement to a person whose 
expertise or judgment they trust”.10 This type of adjudication started very freely and has gotten 
some characteristic features as the final and binding award, the need of an agreement to 
                                                 
8 Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Redfern, A., & Hunter, M. (2015). p. 12. 
9 United Nations. (2012). 
10 Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Redfern, A., & Hunter, M. (2015). p. 1 
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arbitrate, some optional arbitration rules that can be used, and the creation of institutions of 
arbitration which help parties in their arbitration process. Obligatory international instruments 
do not state the rules concerning the arbitration itself, it just organizes recognition and 
enforcement procedure. The rest is dependent to parties because of party autonomy and some 
elements includes a special role of the State.  
 
1.2 Short history of arbitration 
Since the 20th century, globalization and technologic improvements had an effect of increasing 
substantially international commerce. With international arbitration, the need of a suitable 
arbitration process which would be truly international appeared. Indeed, the recognition on a 
global scale was also important and pushed the idea of an autonomous arbitration system. At 
that time, international arbitration was still very national and binding arbitration agreements for 
the future were not available.11 
As a response to these problems, the international community, in the League of Nations, 
established the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses. It held the possibility of having 
an arbitration agreement for existing and future disputes. It also brought the possibility to have 
an arbitration in a country where “none of the party is subject”.12 Moreover, its second point 
dealt with the procedure that must be decided by the will of the parties and by the law of the 
seat of arbitration. However, this Geneva Protocol was not considered as sufficient and the 
Geneva Convention was adopted later in 1927. 
This 1927 Geneva Convention for the execution of foreign arbitral awards laid down the 
principle of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and brought a clear framework of conditions 
of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by drafting cumulative conditions in 
order to obtain execution. Though, its problem was the extensive power given to State courts 
for not recognizing arbitral awards.  These problems were acknowledged and new negotiations 
already started before the Second World War. The other problem was the sole recognition of 
awards that complied with the law of the seat of arbitration. The idea of an international award 
which would not be linked to any national law was launched during the negotiations in 1953 
for the future New York Convention.13 However, this idea of linking the international award 
                                                 
11 UNCTAD (2003). 
12 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (1923). 
13 Report and Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by the Committee on International Commercial Arbitration 
at its meeting of 13 March 1953, reprinted in: The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin Vol. 9/No.1 – 
May 1998 (U.N. DOC E/ C.2/373). 
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only to the International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter ‘ICC) and not to any national court 
was demanding and maybe too much of a development for international community at that 
time. This proposition will be the topic of the thesis in the following section and it will be 
studied whether this kind of proposition is theoretically and practically possible. 
Finally, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(hereinafter ‘New York Convention’ and ‘NY Convention) was adopted in 1958. The concept 
of double exequatur was eliminated and replaced by the concept of prima facie enforcement. 
Before, there was a need of a recognition of enforceability by national courts from the seat of 
arbitration in order to get enforcement by the third country. This change is quite interesting 
regarding the autonomous principle because it decreases the grip of the State of the place of 
arbitration in the arbitration proceedings and gives more autonomy.  
In 1961, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted and it 
was the first time the term of “international commercial arbitration” was used in an international 
instrument. Otherwise, it “failed to meet its objectives”.14 Afterward, arbitration rules were 
adopted in different areas around the world as the Uniform Law of the European Council (1966) 
and also UNCITRAL Rules (1985) with the latter suiting more to arbitration between civil and 
common law countries. The latter was so unanimously recognized that it was used for 
arbitration between the U.S. and the USSR. UNIDROIT adopted its Model Law which helps 
developing countries to equip themselves with a suitable legislation for international 
commercial arbitration in 1985. 
 
1.3 Problem 
The main question of the thesis will be:  
Is it possible to think and implement an autonomous 
international commercial arbitration? 
This question is very general and the thesis cannot answer to this question with all its practical 
consequences. For that reasons, the theoretical part will be quite important during the whole 
thesis but concerning the practicalities, there is going to be a special focus. Indeed, the thesis 
will only look at two main elements of arbitration proceedings which are public policy and 
enforcement issues. These are the most problematic areas where the State is supposedly needed. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Redfern, A., & Hunter, M. (2009). p. 70 
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1.4 Roadmap  
In order to answer the question of the previous section, this thesis will be divided in four 
chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to an historical analysis of commercial law and 
arbitration from ancient times to nowadays. This historical study will allow to see how the 
relationship between adjudication and the State had worked in the past and the neutrality 
promised in the previous section will be tried in that chapter because of the highly political 
assessment of history in commercial law.  
The second chapter is theoretical. The different theories explaining the nature of arbitration will 
be studied and among them, the most important for this thesis: the autonomous theory of 
arbitration. The latter is going to be studied in detail in order to see the possible advantages and 
criticisms of this theory to have a theoretical background for the next chapters.  
The third chapter will mainly focus on two detailed theoretical problems in the theory: public 
policy and enforcement. These two elements of ICA will be studied de lege lata and de lege 
feranda in the perspective of an autonomous arbitration. This chapter will bring empirical 
research to demonstrate that these problems are not practical problems.  
Last but not least, the fourth chapter will be mainly general and will discuss the autonomous 
theory as an utopia. The autonomous theory will also be assessed through its possibility and its 
desirability nowadays.  
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2  Historical insight  
Understanding law implies to understand its history. The history is an undeniable tool to 
demonstrate the importance of the debate of an autonomous ICA. The history, even 
controversial at some points, shows the interest of talking and debating about the possibility of 
an ICA freed from the State interference.  
When starting the history of commercial law, it must be known that its “earlier content […] 
remains shrouded in mystery”.15 More than mystery, history of commercial law is also 
obstructed by ideological disputes in the scholarship. The summary of history that will be made 
is going to be objective and try not to fall in the trap of the controversy between proponents of 
lex mercatoria and its opponents which accuse the latter side of having idealized the obfuscated 
history.  
The only point on which historians of law do not differ is the general first proof of existence of 
commercial law: Code of Hammurabi. Concerning the Antiquity and the Medieval Period, the 
battle is still going on behalf of lex mercatoria while the Modern Period remains less disputed. 




Commercial law was not something well developed at the time of Antiquity. At the same time, 
it cannot be said that commerce existed in a very developed way. Indeed, “95 per cent of the 
necessities of a household were satisfied by the labour of its members and dependents only 5 
per cent by purchases in the market.”16 These figures show how commerce was a minor element 
in Ancient Greek society. So, commerce was not something as important as it is nowadays.17 
For this summary of commercial litigation in Ancient Greece, most of what will be say can be 
found in Francois Morel’s book.18 The choice of this book as a basis of the history of 
commercial law in antiquity is due to its lack of bias in the debate over lex mercatoria.  
 
Concerning Greeks, he speculates on the presence of special commercial courts by giving 
evidence taken from that time’s writings. He distinguishes ‘nautodices’ which were judges 
                                                 
15 Goode, R. M., Kronke, H., & McKendrick, E. (2015).  p. 11 
16 Hourwich, I. (1915). 
17 According to the statistics of the WTO, the amount of “merchandise exports of WTO members totaled US$ 
16.2 trillion in 2015”. World Trade Organization (2016). 
18 Morel, F. (1897).    
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chosen among merchants and which were authorized to investigate the case themselves. The 
latter is generally forbidden in Athenian Courts. Moreover, these Courts handled by 
‘nautodices’ do not allow any appeal, so their decision is irrevocable.19 The author recognizes 
some arbitrators as well in the name of ‘epagogue’ which were required to settle disputes during 
the journey on a ship, its decision being final. These ‘epagogue’ had to judge ex aequo et bono.20 
 
Concerning Romans, the author is clear about the absence of such a division between 
commercial and civil matters. His argument is about closeness of the society and the uselessness 
of such a division when civil law can cover all commercial matters at stake. Romans would 
have been surprised to challenge their unity of law. Reforms in Roman Empire were not even 
clear, he insists, as the effort of jurists to change the interpretation of a text shows it. There was 
no division of commercial and civil matters but rather a “commercialisation progressive du 
droit civil”.21 Jus gentium was enough, no commercial law nor commercial courts were needed. 
 
2.2 Medieval period 
In High Middle Ages, trade was growing and expanding through Europe. Fairs became quickly 
important in Medieval Europe as trade grew. The ones in Champagne and Flanders were so 
important that they could last more than a month. Medieval period has been characterized by a 
severe lack of governmental sovereignty. Feudalism was reigning in everyday life and State 
power was only another layer of power between the Church, the Municipality and sometimes 
Guilds. Due to that lack of a centralized powerful authority, commercial law managed to evolve 
in an original way throughout Europe. Two visions of the Medieval Period will be studied, the 
realist one and the romantic one.22 
 
The romantic view of Medieval period points out the uniformity of the customs and rules 
created in Medieval Europe. Lord Mansfield is considered as one of the main scholars having 
this view. He believed in the private order created at that time without the need of a legislator. 
Harold Berman supports him by featuring commercial law at that time through these 
characteristics: objectivity, universality, reciprocity of rights, participatory adjudication, 
                                                 
19 Ibidem. p. 8 
20 Ibid. p. 10 
21 Ibid. p. 16. “progressive commercialisation of civil law” (author’s translation) 
22 Elcin, M. (2012). p. 11 
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integration, and growth.23 The proponents of the romantic view oppose the fragmentation of 
civil law between the Church, the Municipality, and the King to the unification of law merchant 
in Europe. The argument in favour of a European unification of law merchant is the existence 
and functioning of fairs. These types of events happened in all Western Europe and gathered 
merchants from all Europe.  
For example, the bills of exchanges were created so that merchants coming from far do not have 
to carry money with them. The perfect example of autonomy of law merchant can be seen 
through the institution of ‘mercanzia’. François Morel insists in this unofficial existence of 
‘mercanzia’ which is a dispute settlement institution created by the agglomeration of all guilds. 
These guilds were powerful elements of Medieval Europe and their gathering allowed the 
creation of a powerful private tribunal. This private justice acquired a general jurisdiction over 
commercial matters. Thus, this tribunal accepted affiliates and non-affiliates. The judgment was 
made with a closer look to facts than law. As it was specially shaped for merchants, the justice 
was quick and nobody risked anything by being judged by them because it was not a waiver of 
their right to go before ordinary judges. With the available choice, ‘mercanzia’ attracted many 
cases. However, its right to judge was dependent on the express consent and its rights to 
enforcement were rather limited. This problem ended when Florentine Law recognized 
‘mercanzia’ as an official tribunal. This recognition meant an efficient process of litigation and 
the possibility to enforce its decisions. This institution was “privée, contractuelle et 
corporative”24 and it became public, binding and official.25 
 
This type of evolution of commercial law is exactly what can justify the existence of a lex 
mercatoria. François Morel states that this process happened around all Italy.26 This type of 
process shows the importance of private ordering in a society where the State is missing. This 
lack of State power gave the opportunity for private guilds to take political power by creating 
judicial institutions that became public because of their efficiency. The capture by the State is 
a result of the empowerment of the State. Moreover, these private ordered arbitration systems 
justify the existence of a merchant law created by their own without the need of a State. 
However, it must not be forgotten that, in that case, the municipal power gave the recognition 
and it really put forth the popularity of the institution by bringing enforcement powers. 
                                                 
23 Goode, R. M., Kronke, H.C, & McKendrick, E. (2015) p.14-15 quoting Berman, H. J. (2003).  
24 Morel, F. (1897). p. 52. “private, contractual and guild-based” (author’s translation) 
25 Ibidem. p. 80 
26 Ibid. p. 53  
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Ironically, apologists of lex mercatoria stay at this point of the analysis and does not evoke 
other places of Europe where the situation was not quite the same. Indeed, as said above, the 
historical insight must be objective and other sides of Medieval Europe seems to disprove the 
idea of a European global merchant law. 
 
Realists of Medieval Period are not refusing to see the real development of some private ordered 
institutions. On the contrary, their role is to bring uncertainty in the history of commercial law 
without breaking all the foundations. Certainly, critics of the romantic view can be fierce as 
Emily Kadens’ article shows it and her use of this expression: “tale of the law merchant”.27 
However, the content of her criticism is not completely non-constructive. She is telling that this 
story is “flawed in various respects”28 but does recognize the importance that customs had. 
However, she is not giving the same importance to the customs as the romantics gave, there is 
no law merchant unified in Europe for her and for realists in general. She is willing to 
rehabilitate the role of the State that romantics and transnationalists have broken by considering 
that the regulation of the State was “forced and unwanted”.29 Kadens proves that custom was a 
problem for merchants because of its uncertainty and “its ability to evolve”.30 She demonstrates 
that merchants wanted certainty to trade properly. The autonomy of commercial law and 
institutions in Northern Italy is not denied as the balanced presentation of history is given in 
Goode, Kronke and McKendrick’s book.31 
Concerning the existence of lex mercatoria as a set of substantive rules, realists do not agree. 
In Medieval period, substantive rules are considered as “immutable, invariable and 
unattainable on earth”32 and so nobody would be able to change them for merchants. For this 
reason, they tend to accept only a special set of procedural rules made for merchants.  
Moreover, realists refuse to recognize the existence of a unified set of customs throughout 
Europe. Kadens33 proves, through historical facts, that even merchants were requiring a 
regulation from the Municipality or from the King. She refuses to fall on the simple dichotomy 
“between good custom and bad regulation34” and recognizes that some State regulations were 
also made to improve merchants’ life along with the self-interest of the State.  
                                                 
27 Kadens, E. (2008).  
28 Ibidem. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Goode, R. M., Kronke, H., & McKendrick, E. (2015). Section 1.19 
32 Elçin, M. (2012). p.12 
33 Kadens, E. (2008). 
34 Ibid. 
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Realists emphasize the relativity of what happened in Northern Italy. This kind of 
empowerment of merchants was not the norm and Francois Morel shows it with the example 
of Germany. In Germany, the development has been completely different. He opposes the 
Italian view where the advantages were taken while in Germany, merchants got their 
advantages granted by the Emperor. Firstly, merchants were introduced in urban courts, they 
passed from advisor to real judges in commercial cases by changing the procedure for 
themselves – making it quicker and more efficient. Though when urban courts got attached to 
the new discovery of roman law by making the procedure more complex, the commercial side 
of urban courts split and it became another institution with the jurisdiction over commercial 
matters.35  
 
Even though the existence of lex mercatoria in Medieval period has been a point in the debate 
between realists and romantics, it is sure that they mostly agree on one point: commercial law 
and institutions improved and expanded themselves during Medieval Period. However, from 
the point of view of an autonomous theory, Medieval Period did not have a fully harmonized 
European lex mercatoria but it existed some autonomous initiatives made by Guilds to regulate 
disputes among merchants. However, the historical context was completely different because 
the State was not dominant and no State positivism was present to stop these initiatives. On the 
contrary, this autonomous creation was needed because no dominant social institutions were 
present.   
 
2.3 Modern history 
Modern history is less controversial for history of law. Modern history is famous for the rising 
of the State power and capture of private endeavours by the State. Mercanzia are an example 
of this capture because the City of Florence made it official and public while it started as a 
private enterprise. However, this capture did not equate to compliance by everyone. It cannot 
be compared to nowadays where legislation is assimilated to major compliance. Acts of the 
State were not strictly followed.36 Emily Kadens takes the example of the prohibition of 
compound interest in 1673 in France. Despite this enactment, “[the King] was not powerful 
enough to ensure it was accepted and followed, not even by royal courts.”37 
                                                 
35 Morel, F. (1897) p. 99 
36 Kadens, E. (2008). 
37 Ibid.  
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For Romantics, the rising of States explains the fragmentation of law merchant because every 
State created their own commercial law and it gave birth to differences between countries. 
Realists deny this fact by saying that this ideal did not exist before. Moreover, romantics which 
are quite keen to see this regulation as a fragmentation of lex mercatoria seem to forget one of 
the goal of these new regulations: “garantir la sécurité des échanges”.38 Security is the first 
element that merchants actually wanted in order to trade properly.  
In France, the State increases its domination on the country and one of its symptoms in 
commercial law is the creation of Commercial Courts in 1563. Judges were merchants and the 
procedure was shaped as quicker than civil courts, the objective of improving merchants’ life 
could clearly be seen. However, this capture of power is slow and guilds are maintained until 
the French Revolution. When the Revolution happened, Le Chapelier Act suppressed all guilds 
of merchants. The only remedy for merchants is the State now. For the substantive law, Louis 
XIV made decrees of codifications and Napoleon arranged it to create the Commercial Code. 
Then, in 1807, in France, the capture of commercial law by the State is achieved.  
 
To conclude, Modern Period is going against what the Medieval Period built. It is the period of 
the rising of State power and of the capture of commercial law by the State. From that moment, 
Commercial Law is associated with the State and customs are forgotten because a period of 
legal formalism and positivism starts until the contemporary trend of fast-paced globalization 
comes to shatter everything again. 
 
Concerning the impact on the autonomy of arbitration, it can be said that Modern Period is the 
one that inspired State dominance over arbitration proceedings. Medieval Period, on the 
contrary, inspired new theories on arbitration which are thinking ICA as autonomous.  
Generally speaking, it can be seen that history of commercial law is bringing a needed insight 
to the question of autonomy. Medieval period is presented as much chaotic but also open to 
autonomous initiatives while the Modern Period was the beginning of a general paradigm 
dominating current legal theory: state positivism.   
                                                 
38 Thaller, E.-E., & Percerou, J. (1936). p.38 “guarantee security of exchanges” (author’s translation). 
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3 Foundations of ICA and the autonomous theory 
The debate on the foundations of ICA can be divided in two: the first one amounts to the 
classical division which is looking at the origin of the power of the arbitrators while the 
contemporary division is mostly about jurisdictions controlling the arbitration proceedings. 
Indeed, the first debate is similar to the one about party autonomy in national contract law while 
the second is typical of ICA. Most of the scholars are mostly dealing with much technical issues 
because foundations of ICA are a legal theory issue and does not attract most of the practical-
minded scholars. However, these theoretical debates are full of consequences. The first debate 
about foundations appeared in the early 1970s while the new one appears in this millennium. 
Indeed, the classical division deals with the question of whether the contract or the State is at 
the foundations of the ICA while the modern division disputes the link of international 
arbitration with States. 
 
3.1 Classical division and its implications for the autonomy 
Concerning the classical division, it is the first element that continues to be debated in the 
middle of the second half of the 21st century. The idea was to question the underlying power of 
the arbitral tribunal. As emphasized by Katherine Lynch, “these differences of opinion over the 
theoretical basis for arbitration and the nature and legitimacy of the arbitral process, are 
important because the way in which ICA is characterized affects the manner in which the extent 
and scope of applicable rules in arbitration are determined”.39 This debate comprises proponents 
of contractual theory, jurisdictional theory, and the ones that are thinking of a hybrid theory.  
 
3.1.1 Contractual theory 
Also called the theory of party autonomy, this theory emphasizes the role of the parties and 
their agreement. It supports that arbitration is based only on parties’ agreement rather than the 
will of the State. As the wish of the parties is supposed to prevail, procedural and substantive 
laws are the choice of the parties and no necessary link with the seat of arbitration is expected. 
Fouchard, Gaillard, and Goldman’s book presents this theory as “not disputed: an arbitrator's 
power to resolve a dispute is founded upon the common intention of the parties to that 
dispute”.40 However, this statement is clearly ideological because at the time of the publication 
of the book, the question was a matter of debate.  
                                                 
39 Lynch, K. (2003) p.65 
40 Fouchard, P., Gaillard, E., Goldman, B., Savage, J., & Fouchard, P. (1999). p.29 
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This theory emphasizes the only will of the parties which, in their point of view, is sufficient to 
constitute arbitration. The State is not considered relevant in the process. Frances Kellor talks 
about arbitration as being “wholly voluntary in character. […] No law requires the parties to 
make such a contract, nor does it give one party power to impose it on another.”41 This emphasis 
is going to be the basis of the autonomous theory of arbitration that will be seen in the next 
section.  
The contractual theory of arbitration is sometimes criticized because of its over-emphasis on 
parties’ agreement. This focus is considered as too important and thus preventing parties to see 
the reality of the arbitration and its context. This is what Lynch articulates when she considers 
that contractual theory “ignores the context of national legal systems within which international 
commercial arbitration is embedded”.42 Moreover, she stands for a “minimum form of control” 
of parties’ agreement43 in order to check, at least, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and 
fairness of the proceedings. This criticism of the contractual theory is mostly found among the 
proponents of the jurisdictional theory. 
 
3.1.2 Jurisdictional theory 
The jurisdictional theory is the state positivist view of arbitration and it emphasizes “the 
complete authority and supervisory powers of the state to regulate any ICAs within its territorial 
jurisdiction”.44 The most famous proponent of jurisdictional theory is Francis Mann. This 
theory can be considered as the most intuitive to lawyers which are generally educated within 
the domestic level and tend to link everything to the power of the State. 
Mann can be quoted as follow: “Every arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject 
to a specific system of national law”.45 Mann demonstrates, in his article, that the State has 
jurisdiction over all the activities happening in its territory and for that reason, the State must 
explain arbitration.46 Thus, arbitration is happening because the State allowed it. The concerned 
State is indeed the seat of arbitration and no others can claim such rights according to Mann.  
                                                 
41 Yu, H. (2008) quoting Kellor, F., Sturges, W. A., & American Arbitration Association. (1941). Arbitration in 
action: A code for civil, commercial and industrial arbitrations. New York: Harper & Bros. 
42 Lynch, K. (2003) p.67 
43 Ibidem. p.68 
44 Ibid. p.68 
45 Mann, F. A. (1976). 
46 Ibidem. “Every right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a system of 
municipal law”  
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Roy Goode presents different advantages of the jurisdictional theory in his article.47 He 
considers that there is no contract without law, that this theory respects also the autonomy of 
the parties. Moreover, he insists on the certainty this theory gives to the process because then, 
the seat of the arbitration get a comprehensive power over the proceedings and can shape it as 
it wants. It must be said that Goode is so against the possible contractual theory that he would 
like to see Article VII of the NY Convention amended.48 
To finish with, it can be said that Lynch does not find this theory enough suitable to explain the 
nature of arbitration because she finds that it gives “insufficient weight to the importance of the 
parties’ agreement”.49 
 
3.1.3 Hybrid theory 
The hybrid version is a compromise between contractual and jurisdictional theory. This 
compromise can be expressed as a harmonized mixture of the two previous theories. Lynch 
finds this theory suitable because she says that it “presents a more realistic conception of 
modern ICA and underscores the necessity of ensuring effective control and governance of the 
system by national legal system”.50 Developed by Sauser Hall, Hong-Lin Yu51 uses this quote 
in her article:  
“a mixed juridical institution, sui generis, which has its origin in the 
[parties’] agreement and draws its jurisdictional effects from the civil 
law.”52 
This theory of compromise has been adopted by Redfern and Hunter who wrote a handbook on 
international arbitration53 where is it clearly said that “International commercial arbitration is a 
hybrid”.54 However, this theory has been criticized for its lack of strength because it does not 
really solve the problem of the nature of the arbitration. On the contrary, by acknowledging 
both theories, the hybrid theory of arbitration seal the problem without any further debate. 
 
                                                 
47 Goode, R. (2001).   
48 Ibidem. “A strong case can be made for amending Article VII of the Convention by restricting its scope to 
treaties entered into by the enforcing state - removing that part of Article VII which enables a party to invoke the 
more favourable provisions of the law of enforcement” 
49 Lynch, K. (2003) p.69 
50 Ibidem p.71 
51 Yu, H. (2008). 
52 Sauser-Hall, G. (1957). L'arbitrage en Droit International Privé, 44(I) ANN. INST. DR. INTERN. 469 (1952) 
& 47(II) ANN. INST. DR. INTERN. 394 
53 Redfern, A., & Hunter, M. (2009). 
54 Redfern, A., & Hunter, M. (2009). p.30 
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3.2 Modern division and its implications for the autonomy 
Once the first debate has been solved, or that a compromise has been found, it is time to see 
whether this modern division is still ongoing. This debate is still new and has been mostly 
dominated by the epistemic community of arbitrators even though some new critics appear. In 
the context of fast-paced globalization and rather difficulty of States to follow the growth in 
cross-border exchanges, the debate over which states arbitration must be anchored to is a 
striking question. In this regard, scholars have replied in different manners but three main 
answers appear: some are linking arbitration proceedings to the only seat of arbitration while 
the others are anchoring it to the plurality of states. Finally, the last theory anchors arbitration 
to none of the States but consider ICA as an autonomous legal order.  
 
3.2.1 Seat-based International Commercial Arbitration 
The first answer concerning the special link that ICA have with states is the one that considers 
international arbitration having its foundation on the sole seat of the arbitration. Scholars 
analysed it objectively but also criticized this vision of the foundations of ICA and it would be 
useful to see whether this vision can endure criticisms. Finally, despite being an outdated vision, 
it will be seen that some scholars are still adopting it and that this representation sees new 
development. 
 
3.2.1.1 Differing representations 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Francis Mann’s national ICA view 
Francis Mann’s vision of the foundations of international arbitration can be summarized with 
its own words as follow:  
In the legal sense no international commercial arbitration exists. Just as, 
notwithstanding its notoriously misleading name, every system of private 
international law is a system of national law, every arbitration is a national 
arbitration, that is to say, subject to a specific system of national law.55 
This famously quoted part of his article Lex Facit Arbitrum summarizes efficiently his point of 
view. For him, the concept of ICA does not exist because he believes in automatic attachment 
of cross-border arbitration to the legal order of the seat of arbitration. This point of view is 
emphasized in his article where he denounces the autonomist point of view of his colleagues 
                                                 
55 Mann, F.A. (1976) 
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(Berthold Goldman, C.N. Fragistas). He does not think such a dream possible and consider it 
even as a “problem of the supremacy of the law in the field of arbitration”.56. This point of view 
is indeed influenced with state positivism. 
For Mann, the State has the jurisdiction over “every activity occurring on (its) territory”57 and 
he concludes that it is not possible for an arbitration not to be regulated by the State. He insists 
on the supremacy of State law over its territory. Moreover, his positivism is showed by this 
specific phrasing: “every right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or 
derived from a system of municipal law”.58 It is reminiscent of positivism and the impossibility 
of having a law coming from another order than municipal legal order. This positivism is statist 
because Mann cannot imagine a right conferred from another institution than the State. 
Mann considers the place of arbitration as a seat governing all the aspects of arbitration. As 
analysed by Paulsson, this representation offers the advantage of bringing predictability and 
consistency.59 This analysis is relevant because it brings one clear foundation to ICA: the seat 
of the arbitration. Mann’s theory is simple and does not require knowing more than the law of 
the seat of arbitration. If the award is set aside, the analysis of the case would be finished 
because as the seat is the foundation, setting aside the award would be the end of the case and 
it would mean that there is no award anymore. It will be shown later how inaccurate this view 
can be.  
 
Jan Paulsson presents this theory carefully before criticizing it in his book named The Idea of 
Arbitration. For example, Jan Paulsson gives a clear name to this representation or movement, 
it is the “territorialist view”.60 It is an accurate name because of the specific importance this 
representation gives to the territory of arbitration. It relates all arbitrations to the territory where 
they have their seat. Paulsson denounces the inaccuracy of the territorialist view. 
 
Finally, this view of anchoring arbitration proceedings to the sole State which happens to be 
the seat of arbitration is closely connected to the jurisdictional theory. Both are State positivist 
views. However, the focus is on different aspects. In this modern debate, Mann is considered 
as the one who attaches ICA to the sole legal order of the seat of the arbitration. However, in 
the classical debate, it has been considered that Mann justified all arbitration proceedings by 




59 Paulsson, J. (2013). p.34 
60 Ibidem. p.29 
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the State. The modern debate is mostly taking the international point of view and that is the 
reason why Emmanuel Gaillard will insist on the fact that Mann anchored arbitration in the 
only seat of arbitration.  
 
3.2.1.1.2 Emmanuel Gaillard’s monolocal view 
Emmanuel Gaillard, in Legal Theory of International Arbitration, analyses the different 
representations of the foundations of international arbitration in order to present his own theory. 
Even though he does not support the monolocal view61, he analyses its philosophical postulates 
and its implications.  
Gaillard considers that this monolocal view is assimilating the judge to an arbitrator.62 Indeed, 
it is the exact content of Mann’s thinking.63 However, this view denies arbitration as an 
alternative dispute resolution. It brings the arbitrator and the judge at the same level and the 
peculiarities of the arbitrators are then faded and there is no alternative then. What could be the 
incentives for businesses to participate in arbitration if arbitrators are assimilated to judges?  
In the monolocal representation of international arbitration, Gaillard sees two points of view: 
objectivist and subjectivist64. The objectivist view corresponds to the assimilation of the 
arbitration to the judge and the reasoning pushes the arbitrator to apply only national laws. In 
the subjectivist view, parties are considered to have agreed on a seat of arbitration which means 
that the arbitration will be ruled by national laws. Mann considers then the choice of the place 
of arbitration as a choice of law for the arbitration. Gaillard recognizes the “highly speculative 
exercise”65 that constitutes such a subjectivist view.  
 
Gaillard continues his analysis with stating philosophical postulates of this representation. He 
recognizes a pursuit for order and state positivism in this monolocal view. 
The quest for order refers to what Paulsson said about predictability and efficiency in the 
previous part, Gaillard argues the same by saying this vision implicitly considers that this 
solution is preferable to nothing. This pursuit “readily favor[ing] injustice over chaos”66, it is 
better for the proponents of order to prefer injustice caused by the monolocal view. This 
                                                 
61 Gaillard names Mann’s point of view monolocal. Gaillard, E. (2012) p.25 
62 Ibidem. p.15 
63 “There is a pronounced similarity between the national judge and the arbitrator in that both of them are 
subject to the local sovereign.” Mann, F.A. (1976)  
64 Gaillard, E. (2012) p.15 
65 Ibidem. p.20 
66 Ibid. p.24. 
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monolocal view is simple and efficient because of its assimilation of the arbitrator to the judge. 
With this monolocal view, international arbitration is assimilated to national arbitration and 
there is no complexity due to its cross-border features. So, this theory brings simplicity on a 
complex field of law. Indeed, as this theory does not dominate contemporary scholars, ICA is 
considered as a very challenging matter with intertwined legal orders that lawyers must 
understand. That is the reason why Gaillard says that this theory is implicitly looking for an 
order in this field even though it over-simplifies and brings injustice.  
 
The other philosophical postulate that Gaillard finds is state positivism. It is clear in Mann’s 
article that he trusts the power of the State and its exclusive dominion over all the affairs 
happening in its territory. This belief in the rationality of the State and its capacity to deal with 
everything is statism. However, this statism is supplemented by positivism because Mann 
cannot imagine anything justified by any other things than contemporary laws. Gaillard refers 
to Kelsen and Hart as theoretical basis of this jurisdictional theory. This state positivism can be 
summarized as follow: “every right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred 
by or derived from a system of municipal law”.67  
  
3.2.1.2 Criticisms 
This view has been more and more criticized and its influence decreased since the publication 
of Mann’s article in 1976. There are two types of criticisms against this theory: the 
simplification argument and the argument of inadequacy with reality.  
This monolocal or territorialist thesis is not an accurate depiction of reality, it oversimplifies 
the complex world and ICA. Everything is changing so fast and commerce is so quick, diverse 
and internationalized that it is difficult to know how to categorize everything. Chaos can be 
sometimes the word to consider for fast-paced globalization. It is the same for arbitration, all 
the cases are not simple and with digitalization, it happens that there are no seats due to the 
proceedings happening online. Moreover, using national law is not always adequate regarding 
the complexity of the issues. For these reasons, the monolocal thesis is inaccurate and does not 
face the real world. 
 
This thesis is based on a classical assumption of international law. It does not consider anything 
apart from power of the States. The best evidence of this is when Mann talks about a treaty, he 
                                                 
67 Mann, F.A. (1976)  
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sums it up by saying that the State accepted it and that is the reason why it constitutes a national 
element as well.68 Mann misses completely the evolution of transnational law and private 
ordering because of his state positivist bias. It precludes him from capturing the reality and 
proposing a more suitable theory. That is exactly what Claire A. Cutler tells in her book.69 
 
The second criticism is about the inadequacy with the facts. The first example is the NY 
Convention which eliminates the concept of double exequatur. Since the Convention, parties 
are not required to receive authorization to recognize and enforce the award once it has been 
rendered in the seat. It means that the seat of arbitration retains the right to set aside the award 
but if not, it does not have the power to authorize enforcement in another country. This meant 
that before, the jurisdiction of the place of arbitration had to give an exequatur of enforceability 
of the award and it meant a formal control by the judge of the award before enforceability. This 
element is an evidence that the place of arbitration does not retain all the power that Mann says 
it should. Since the NY Convention, the place of arbitration does not control all the awards 
made in its territory. This detachment from the place of arbitration is more important in some 
countries as Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland where it is possible for parties to waive their 
right of judicial review of their award if none of them are nationals of the seat.70 Moreover, the 
last element which shows the inaccuracy is a new practice used mostly by France and United 
States: recognition and enforcement of set aside awards.71 This shows how ICA cannot be only 
anchored in the seat of arbitration because other countries can do whatever they want.  
 
There is only a minority of scholars which are standing for this thesis because of its clear 
problems. Paulsson tells clearly that: “It simply does not fit the realities of an international 
society no longer constrained within national units - a world, moreover, in which national legal 
systems understand this new flux”72. The monolocal thesis seems extinguished. However, it 
seems like there are still some authors who are standing for this thesis and it constitutes a new 
development in this theory. 
                                                 
68 “The Geneva Convention of 1961 applies only by reason of the fact that the State controlling the arbitration 
has become a Party to it.” Mann, F.A. (1976). 
69 “Conventional theories of international relations and international law are incapable of capturing these 
developments.” Cutler, C. A. (2003). p.2 
70 In France, Article 1522 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Belgium, Article 1717(4) of the Belgian Judicial 
Code. In Switzerland, Article 192(1) of the Swiss Private International Act. In Sweden, Article 51 of the Swedish 
Arbitration Act. See Strik, Daniella. (2012). 
71 Gaillard, E. (2012) p. 136 
72 Paulsson, J. (2010).  
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3.2.1.3 New development 
In this part, there are two authors who are going to be evoked: Won L. Kidane and Sundaresh 
Menon.  
Concerning Sundaresh Menon, he stands for the territorialist approach that he considers as a 
“safeguard (of) the international character of arbitration. It prevents vaguely defined domestic 
normative values of the enforcement court from intruding into the realm of international 
arbitration.”73 Menon is standing, in this speech, against the above-mentioned enforcement of 
set aside awards and proposes the territorialist approach as a solution. For him, it increases 
“transaction costs if parties had to take into account the laws and judicial system of not just the 
seat, but all the places where enforcement may possibly be sought subsequently when deciding 
whether to include an arbitration agreement”.74. His arguments are strong and his view is 
seductive. However, it brings the same problem of simplification because for Menon, “when 
the award is set aside in the seat, the game would by and large be over.”75 
 
Concerning Won L. Kidane, he is also a critique of international arbitration and a proponent of 
the territorialist view. He is supporting David Caron who says that “international arbitration – 
be it investment or arbitration – is not a system, it is a framework”.76 Kidane considers that 
supranational autonomous arbitration has been an ‘illusion’ created by European big cases.77 
He is supporting state decisions in big cases like Salini case. His perspective is mostly neo-
colonial; he is for example supporting the Court of the seat in Salini case78 which has been 
ignored. In this case where Gaillard participated, Kidane says that the only evidence that 
Gaillard uses through this case is the one that “paints the political picture of well-known and 
well-connected arbitrators ignoring the courts of developing countries under the pretext of 
denial of justice to the private party”. Kidane’s territoralist approach can be discovered when 
he states that Gaillard did not consider the seat because of the arbitrator’s agreement “detached 
from the laws that gave that agreement the force of law in the first place.”.79 This criticism is 
                                                 
73 Menon, S. (2015). 
74 Ibidem. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Kidane, Won L. (2017) p.87-88 
77 Ibidem. p.88 
78 Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage 
Authority, ICC Arbitration No. 10623/AER/ACS. This case in an investment case but it does not matter for that 
purpose.  
79 Kidane, Won L. (2017) p.72 
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clearly territoralist and it shows that this approach is not dead. It is still favored by some scholars 
which are offering new perspectives on ICA and its day-to-day practice. 
 
3.2.2 Westphalian International Commercial arbitration 
The second representation that scholars have is the one linking ICA to a multiplicity of States 
and that its foundation is based in each State equally. This is a renewed territorialist approach 
because it does recognize the possibility of a foundation based on more than one State while 
still relying on State positivism. Jan Paulsson and Emmanuel Gaillard have talked about this 
new plurilocal thesis. Moreover, this theory is considered as the one representing the most 
accurately reality. However, this vision attracts still criticisms. 
  
3.2.2.1 Differing representations 
 
3.2.2.1.1 Jan Paulsson’s multiple view 
Paulsson talks about a ‘pluralistic thesis’80 and takes the example of Hilmarton case81 as an 
evidence of the end of the monolocal representation and the existence of a pluralistic 
foundation. In this case, it is clearly said by French judges that:  
 “an award rendered ‘en matière internationale’ is not ‘integrated into the 
legal order of the state where it was issued with the result that its enforcement 
is a matter for the plenary authority of the forum before which it happens to 
be brought.”82 
In this case, the Court of Cassation in France accepted to enforce an ICA award even though 
set aside in Switzerland. Paulsson presents this case as an evidence of the outdated feature of 
the monolocal view. This case shows that ICA is not only founded upon one country. Moreover, 
the focus of this pluralistic thesis goes towards the country where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought.  
This thesis is not even presented as a thesis but merely as “a simple observation of fact”83 as 
Paulsson says. It is considered as a realistic and objective capture of the reality of ICA. It means 
that ICA is not belonging to its seat and that the fate of the award can change depending on the 
country of recognition and enforcement. Paulsson anchors the ICA to a multiplicity of States. 
                                                 
80 Paulsson, J. (2013) p.35 
81 Société Hilmarton Ltd v. Société Omnium de traitement et de valorisation (OTV), 92-15.137. Court of 
Cassation of France, March 23, 1994. 
82 Paulsson, J. (2013) p.36 
83 Ibidem. p.37 
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This thesis is based on an implied criticism of the monolocal view because it does not rely on 
a legal fiction to state that parties have intended to use the law of the place of arbitration just 
because they chose it as a place of arbitration. As showed in Hilmarton case, French judges 
recognize the lack of connection between the place of arbitration and the case. This is the first 
criticism which can be found in this case. Other courts in the world are not so liberal as French 
courts but it constitutes an evolution that the place of arbitration is not seen as the only one 
which deals with whole arbitration proceedings. 
 
The second criticism of the monolocal approach in the pluralistic approach is the one that refers 
to complexity. This pluralistic approach does not avoid difficulties of ICA and, on the contrary, 
tends to face these complex matters of cross-border disputes and its different interpretations in 
different jurisdictions. Indeed, the enforcement stage of arbitration can be made in a different 
state when the place of arbitration does not constitute the place where the assets of the losing 
party are. In that case, the State where enforcement is sought is not bound in any ways by the 
decision of another State – indeed, these are sovereign states. This is a realistic understanding 
of international law because States do not owe anything to other States. 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Emmanuel Gaillard’s plurilocal view 
As for the monolocal representation, Emmanuel Gaillard analysed philosophical postulates of 
the plurilocal/Westphalian representation. This thesis is still relying on State positivism as said 
above and is based on a Westphalian model.  
However, before entering into philosophical postulates presented by Gaillard, it would be useful 
to copy the definition that Gaillard gave of this plurilocal approach:  
It considers that the source of juridicity of an award does not derive from a 
single legal order – that of the seat – but rather from all legal orders that are 
willing, under certain conditions, to recognize the effectiveness of the 
award.”84 
Here again, it is possible to see the focus on the ending of the process. Unlike the monolocal 
approach focusing mainly on arbitration proceedings, this thesis focuses on the award and its 
fate.85 In this thesis, it is possible to call an arbitration international contrary to the monolocal 
approach which considered ICA as inexistent. This thesis recognizes that more than one State 
are involved in ICA proceedings and the international aspect is then easily recognized.  
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Concerning philosophical postulates, Gaillard starts with the postulate of State positivism. Here 
again, as in the monolocal approach, this approach relies on State positivism and is built on this 
basis. The State and its positive law shall affect ICA even though it concerns not only one 
country but more than one. This is, again, a clear belief in the power of State to regulate ICA. 
However, Gaillard recognizes that this postulate is weak. Gaillard explains that arbitration 
which would be sanctioned at the end by the State is problematic for the positivist view which 
considers that nothing happens without the State consent86.   
 
 The other philosophical postulate presented by Gaillard for this plurilocal thesis is the 
Westphalian model. It refers to Westphalian Treaties which shaped the concept of equal and 
sovereign States in Europe.87 Brought in the context of ICA, it means that each State can carry 
out its own judicial review when required to enforce an award or before.88 This is a very 
scattered theory which does not give a clear vision of the foundations of the ICA but rather one 
which allows States to do their own job without considering the others.  
 
3.2.2.2 Current picture of the ICA system 
This thesis is represented by scholars as the real picture of the ICA system. Unlike the 
territorialist approach which was an inaccurate depiction of reality, this one is illustrated as 
realistic. Paulsson says that “this is not a theory, but a simple observation of fact”.89 Theory and 
practice is going to be used to illustrate this assumption. 
 
Firstly, the NY Convention of 1958 demonstrates the accuracy of the theory. The only 
Convention that exists in ICA is about recognition and enforcement and it shows how important 
this topic is perceived. As said above as a criticism, the NY Convention does not allow double 
exequatur but permits an autonomous review of national courts. Moreover, the NY Convention 
does not anchor arbitration proceedings to the seat of arbitration. On the contrary, the fact that 
the only international binding instrument that exist in ICA deals with recognition and 
enforcement shows how accurate are the proponents of the plurilocal thesis.  
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Secondly, the interpretation of the NY Convention is more and more resembling to the possible 
consequences of the plurilocal thesis. Here again, Article V will be evoked and especially 
Article V(1) which states the following:  
“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request 
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof 
that90 
This article could be understood as an mandatory list of elements which are prohibiting 
recognition and enforcement in the country where it is sought. It was the classical understanding 
of this article, but in France and United States.91 Some judges started to interpret it as a 
possibility of a refusal and not a mandatory refusal and they started to accept recognition and 
enforcement even though the arbitral award was set aside in the seat of the arbitration. It 
probably started with SEEE v. Yugoslavia92 as Gaillard wrote.93 In this case, an award was 
recognized and enforced even though “the award had been considered non-existent in the State 
in which it had been rendered”.94 This case was an international investment arbitration case but 
in this matter, it does not make a big difference between these two. One of the most famous 
case about enforcement of set aside awards is Putrabali case.95 This recognition and 
enforcement of set aside awards is mostly done by France which has a very liberal stance in 
ICA.96 
However, this trend of national courts shows how much the theory is applied. To paraphrase 
Paulsson, it becomes true that this pluralistic theory is not a theory or a thesis anymore but 
mostly a capture of facts. However, it does not allow the pluralistic thesis of being free from 
criticisms, on the contrary.   
 
3.2.2.3 Criticisms 
Critics of the pluralistic thesis are also quite heavy and that is understandable because they 
amount to criticizing the current functioning of the ICA system. It is possible to refer to different 
                                                 
90 Article V(1) of the New York Convention (1958) (emphasis added). 
91 The question of the fate of an award set aside at the seat in other legal systems has given rise to a substantial 
case law in two countries: France and the USA.” Gaillard, E. (2012) p. 136 
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criticisms: legal nature of non-enforced awards, lack of a global theory which would comprise 
all aspects of arbitration, and complexity of handling the consequences of this theory.  
 
Firstly, Gaillard criticizes this theory based on the number of awards not enforced by Courts. 
Indeed, the plurilocal view is State positivist and it would mean that these above-mentioned 
awards would lack legal nature even though they do not. A PWC study has concluded that some 
interviewers identified 90% of cases where there was voluntary compliance in their experience 
of ICA.97 So, these awards are not theoretically based because they do not benefit of the sanction 
of the State where recognition and enforcement is sought. For this reason, this theory is flawed.  
 
Secondly, the criticism that can appear is the one relating to the lack of comprehensiveness of 
the theory. By this, it is meant that the theory is not sufficiently general and does not comprise 
all the steps before recognition and enforcement. For example, the arbitration agreement, the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and the proceedings of the tribunal. All these steps are not 
dealt with and it seems odds to give a foundation to a system by putting it at the end of the 
process especially if this type of foundation is rarely used by parties.  
 
Thirdly, Gaillard thinks about the consequences on the arbitrators that this type of theory can 
produce. If all States are entitled to prevail when recognition and enforcement is sought, the 
arbitrator should care about the public policy of each of these States. However, Gaillard says 
that this would be wholly impracticable because “the most restrictive rule [would then] 
prevail[s]”98 and would lead to ‘in defavorem arbitrandum’. Gaillard reassures sceptics by 
saying that arbitrators are not acting as such and that the possible place of enforcement cannot 
be planned beforehand. This criticism refers also to the quest of order seen as a philosophical 
postulate in the previous thesis. In this theory, there is no order, it is the actual international 
anarchy that dominates because each State is sovereign to react in their own way. That is 
actually what Sundaresh Menon, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Singapore, said in his 
famous speech99 when he affirms that “the territorial approach, if widely accepted, would tend 
to discourage forum shopping”. He meant that the Westphalian approach is giving room for 
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parties to do forum shopping as States are free to decide whatever they wish concerning the 
award.  
 
Last but not least, the criticism of State positivism can still be made. This position relies on 
State even though, as said above, the level of State is outdated and does not reply to the 
challenges posed by cross-border disputes. It is the criticism mostly made by transnationalists 
whose theory will be studied in the following subsection.  
 
3.2.3 Autonomous International Commercial Arbitration 
As divided in Gaillard’s book, the third view considers ICA as autonomous and not linked to 
any other legal orders. This is a complete paradigm shift from the classical state positivist view. 
Here, the State is not considered as a relevant level and all arbitration proceedings must be 
considered as happening in a transnational level. This view differs regarding authors but its 
basis remains the same. Above and beyond all theoretical representations, it is interesting to see 
whether this theory have a recognition on the ground. Finally, the autonomous theory being a 
controversial theory, criticisms must be analyzed and their impact must be demonstrated. 
 
3.2.3.1 Differing representations 
 
3.2.3.1.1 Emmanuel Gaillard’s arbitral legal order 
Gaillard’s theory bases the “source of the juridicity of international arbitration”100 in an 
autonomous legal order. ICA is defined by itself because it constitutes its own legal order. 
Unlike to what Kelsen would say, there is no norm which would explain the existence of the 
ICA other than its own norm. Due to that lack of superior norm to explain ICA, Gaillard 
imagines ICA as an autonomous legal order. As stated in his article earlier101, Gaillard reiterates 
his division of arbitral legal order theory in two: jusnaturalist and transnationalist trends. 
 
Hence, Gaillard proposes two ways of explaining and justifying the theory of arbitral legal order 
but rather focuses on the transnational trend. In it, he considers that arbitral legal order is “a 
system rising above each national legal system taken in isolation [that] can be brought about by 
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the convergence of all laws”.102 This is the latter that the author follows with his explanation of 
“transnational rules method”.103 This method helps to find transnational and autonomous 
principles which are going to be the basis of the arbitral legal order. To find them, Gaillard tells 
us “to ascertain the prevailing trend within national laws which obviously does not mean that 
the rule in question has received unanimous recognition”.104 It is a method which recognizes 
rules which are the most adopted by the States and excludes the ones which are unique to some 
States. Gaillard says that this method “is dynamic as it takes into account the evolution of 
national laws”.105 This method will help to secure arbitral legal order with an autonomous 
number of rules. For example, this rule can be considered for public policy issues. The arbitrator 
is not forced to consider specific parochial requirements of each State’s public policy, but he 
only must consider the main rules which are arising out of the international community. 
Professor Loquin talks about “legal Darwinism” because then, States with parochial laws are 
going to be ousted. Professor Loquin’s remark is clearly illustrated106 in Gaillard’s method. 
 
3.2.3.1.2 Jan Paulsson’s autonomous legal order 
Paulsson does not agree with Gaillard. Even though they are evoked in the same section, it 
cannot be said that Paulsson and Gaillard are theoretically compatible. Paulsson does not like 
the “Parisian theory”107 of his colleague and insists on its “dreamy and self-contradictory 
premise of an ‘autonomous’ order recognized by the state orders from which it purports to be 
free”.108 He does not believe in Gaillard’s theory of arbitral legal order and even affirms that 
“the zeal of those who make extravagant claims may do more harm than the resistance of non-
believers and scoffers”. In this affirmation, Paulsson and Gaillard are clearly seen as both 
transnationalists but it does not give birth to similar theories.  
Paulsson’s theory is much more in-depth. It is not a simple refusal of the State interference but 
rather an understanding of the private ordering and its importance. For Paulsson, private 
orderings are legal orders. He does not confront the State and private orderings but rather thinks 
of a ‘fluid legal order’ in which private legal orders are going to perform in the same time as 
national legal orders. He does not see the legal world as a confrontation but mostly a 
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coexistence. For that reason, he does not exclude the need of national courts even though its 
“vision of arbitration […] functions routinely without judicial assistance”.109 This vision is quite 
complex and philosophical because it does not bring a clear answer as Gaillard did, not a sharp 
separation between State and arbitration but rather a fluid coexistence.  
 
To support this argument, Paulsson uses the contrary of State positivism and Kelsenian view, 
he uses Santi Romano and his vision on pluralism of legal orders. Through his theory, Paulsson 
tries to answer to these following questions: what is a legal order? Is it possible to constitute a 
legal order out of the state? For Romano, a legal order is not only the legal order of the State, it 
is much more than that and that is why Paulsson says that “non-state arrangements may lay 
serious claim to qualify as legal orders”.110 To support this view, he shows that “they are 
impersonal; they intend to govern important aspects of social life, and to do so exclusively; and 
their potential to endure seems more than equal to that of a number of troubled states.”111 So, 
by showing the possibility of private arrangements to constitute a legal order, Paulsson prepares 
the ground to say that “arbitration is an obvious potential vehicle for social arrangements 
constituting legal orders outside the conventional statist model”.112 He also argues that the state 
is sometimes not suitable for some matters and that private orderings “may fill the vacuum 
when public institutions fail”. In his book, he is talking about the problems of jurisdictional 
institutions in several states and the denial of justice that it can bring. In that case, it is clear for 
Paulsson that private orderings are much more virtuous. 
For Paulsson, private orderings are sometimes necessary because of the problems inherent to 
State courts. 
“They are members of the United Nations; they enjoy official diplomatic 
relations; their borders are formally acknowledged. But on the ground, on 
the national level of these putative entities, there is nothing that could 
decently be called law, and in some cases, this has been so for generations: 
no constitutional legislature, no law enforcement, no judiciary – nothing but 
a bleak mockery of each of these basic institutions of polity.” 
Regarding the problems of the State, he supports the acknowledgment of non-state legal orders 
in order to bring the possibility of justice. Moreover, his stance is not against State interests 
because he is for a fluid coexistence. This paradigm shift is essential in his point of view, “we 
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will lose our way unless we update our mental maps”.113 Paulsson’s view is quite radical and 
calls for an important paradigm shift when compared to other visions. 
 
3.2.3.2 Level of recognition 
This theory seems completely utopian as said by some114, but it will be seen that its basics are 
somehow embodied in ICA system. For that purpose, the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law will be studied. After that, an overview of the reforms in national level 
will be made with the focus on the improvements regarding the autonomous theory of 
arbitration. Afterward, the liberal stance of French courts will be emphasized in another part. 
Even though there are some kinds of recognition, it must be acknowledged that there is no 
international instrument and national laws which are fully recognizing the autonomous theory 
of arbitration as the foundation of arbitration.  
 
3.2.3.2.1 New York Convention 
Concerning the New York Convention of 1958, it cannot be said that it approves the 
autonomous theory of arbitration. On the contrary, the NY Convention is based on the need of 
the State to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards as its title indicates it. However, it is 
possible to find two articles which are going in the right direction.  
Among them, Article V and its interpretation. Article V regulates different conditions leading 
to a refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Article V recognizes 
arbitrability, incapacity, fairness, equal opportunities to present the case, lack of jurisdiction, 
and set aside awards as reasons for refusal of recognition and enforcement when such 
arguments are brought by one party. Otherwise, the court of recognition and enforcement can, 
in its own initiative, bring the reasons of arbitrability and public policy to refuse recognition 
and enforcement to the award. At first sight, it should not be considered as one going in the 
right direction towards the autonomous theory because it recognizes an important role for the 
court of the State where recognition and enforcement is sought. However, this article has been 
interpreted quite in a liberal way by States and the specific drafting has been used to emphasize 
the autonomous character of arbitration. Indeed, some States have considered that the award 
which has been set aside in the seat of arbitration was not a definitive reason to refuse 
                                                 
113 Ibid. p.49 
114 Kidane, Won L. (2017); Michaels, R. (2013). 
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recognition and enforcement. This understanding was used in several cases especially in 
France.  
Hilmarton115 case of 1994 is striking in this matter because it is the first time when the Court 
of Cassation enforces an arbitral award which has been set aside in its seat. The reasoning is 
quite striking because Article V seemingly appeared as precluding recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards when set aside in the place of arbitration while Article VII was considered as 
the exception. Indeed, Article VII does not “deprive any interested party of any right he may 
have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or 
the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon”. This article has been 
considered as the best choice principle. It means that if French law does not recognize the 
setting aside of the award, it would not constitute a bar to the recognition and enforcement of 
the award. French courts are not considered barred by any decision of setting aside from the 
place of the arbitration. The French Court in Hilmarton states that “la société OTV était fondée 
à se prévaloir des règles françaises relatives à la reconnaissance et à l'exécution des sentences 
rendues à l'étranger en matière d'arbitrage international”.116 French Courts are the courts which 
are recognizing and enforcing the most set aside awards and the reasons will be seen later in 
this subsection.  
 
3.2.3.2.2 UNCITRAL Model law 
Concerning UNCITRAL Model Law in ICA, it must be said that a Model Law is a soft law 
instrument made in order to encourage States to adopt similar regulations on a specific topic. 
In this case, the Model Law promotes States to take specific regulations in ICA in order to suit 
the specific needs of cross-border arbitration. Thus, UNCITRAL’s goal is to achieve certainty 
and predictability of ICA around the world. Indeed, if all the States had the same legislation 
over ICA, there would be no problems concerning arbitration proceedings. The Model Law is 
also pro-autonomous theory of arbitration because its rules are shaping a quite-autonomous 
arbitration model that will be seen below. 
The first article which indicates an implicit recognition of the autonomous theory of arbitration 
is Article 5 of the Model Law. This Article 5, called Extent of Court Intervention117, is important 
                                                 
115 Société Hilmarton Ltd v. Société Omnium de traitement et de valorisation (OTV), 92-15.137. Court of 
Cassation of France, March 23, 1994.  
116 Ibidem. “OTV firm was founded to invoke French rules regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
awards made abroad in the field of international arbitration” (author’s translation). 
117 Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law: “In matter governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except 
where so provided in this law” 
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because it brings a clear line between the possible field in which the Court can arbitrate and the 
rest. It limits clearly the interference of the Court and brings a possibility of the autonomy of 
arbitration proceedings in certain areas. As said above, it is not a full acknowledgment of the 
autonomous theory of arbitration but rather a starting point.  
The other article which implicitly recognizes the autonomous theory of arbitration is Article 35 
of the Model Law, where the arbitral award is completely delinked from the seat of arbitration. 
Several articles are respecting the multilocal approach but tending to the autonomous 
arbitration. Indeed, parties, under the UNCITRAL Model Law, have the choice of their 
procedural law118, place of arbitration119, substantive law120, arbitrators and its numbers121. 
Moreover, the arbitral tribunal retains the power to decide on its own jurisdiction122 and to give 
interim measures123. 
These powers are an acknowledgment of the multilocal approach analysed above, but as 
Paulsson says, the multilocal approach can be considered as the current picture. As the Model 
Law is moving away from the monolocal approach and acknowledging the multilocal, it means 
that the current picture of ICA is closer to the autonomous theory of arbitration. Indeed, there 
is an implicit starting-point of recognition of autonomy of ICA. Moreover, the Model Law has 
been implemented by an increasing number of countries as it will be seen below. 
 
3.2.3.2.3 Reforms and evolution in national level 
Concerning reforms and evolutions in national level recognizing the autonomous theory of 
arbitration, there will be two analyses. The first one is going to be a general evolution towards 
the autonomy where no specific country will be analysed in detail. In the second part, France 
and its liberal stance towards arbitration is going to be the focus.  
 
3.2.3.2.3.1 General evolution towards the autonomy 
The UNCITRAL Model Law has achieved its goal by inducing States to adopt the Model Law 
in their legislation and achieve harmonization throughout the world. Until now, 75 States124 
have UNCITRAL-based legislation in ICA while other countries were only influenced by it.125 
                                                 
118 Article 19 of the Model Law. Determination of rules of procedure 
119 Article 20. Place of arbitration 
120 Article 28.  Rules applicable to substance of dispute 
121 Article 10.  Number of arbitrators 
122 Article 16.  Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction 
123 Article 17.  Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures 
124 UNCITRAL. (website) 
125 English Arbitration Act 1996 will be evoked later in this part. 
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In this part, the assessment of the general evolution towards the autonomy is going to be far 
from exhaustive and for that reason, the focus will be on two elements: the possibility of a 
waiver of right of judicial review in the seat of arbitration, and the English Arbitration Act 1996 
and its importance in the general evolution. 
 
The acknowledgment of the autonomous theory of arbitration is starting to appear slowly and 
implicitly through domestic laws on international commercial arbitration. The most striking 
element showing this recognition is the possible waiver of right to judicial review. This 
possibility exists in several countries as: Switzerland126, Tunisia127, Peru128, Belgium129 and 
others. This type of waiver is generally construed as follows. 
Where none of the parties has its domicile, its habitual residence, or a place 
of business in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the 
arbitration agreement or in a subsequent agreement in writing, exclude all 
setting aside proceedings, or they may limit such proceedings to one or 
several of the grounds listed in Article 190, paragraph 2.130 
Generally, this disposition includes only arbitration cases where no nationals are involved. This 
type of legislation is a clear sign of the autonomous character of arbitration. In that case, all 
international awards, if the parties wish, can be delinked from the place of arbitration and be 
‘floating’. If we consider that most of the awards are complied voluntarily131, it is a legislation 
allowing the autonomy of the arbitration proceedings especially if no court assistance is used 
during the proceedings. Thus, this type of disposition is increasing in domestic ICA laws. 
 
The other clear evolution towards the autonomous theory of arbitration is the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996. The content of the Act in itself is not revolutionary but its context is. 
Chukwumerije sums up the context in the following sentence: “English courts were historically 
suspicious of the arbitral process. This resulted in extensive judicial intrusion in the process”.132 
So, the content is clear, the English system has never been until 1996 a pro-arbitration State 
and did even have some difficulties to acknowledge the severability of the arbitration clause. 
However, in 1996, the English Arbitration Act is passed in order to “liberalize English 
                                                 
126 Article 192 of Private International Law Act.  
127 Article 78(6) of the Tunisian Arbitration Code of 1993. 
128 Article 126 of Peru’s General Law on Arbitration of 1996. 
129 article 1717(4) Belgian Judicial Code 
130 Article 192 of PILA. 
131 90% of ICC awards are complied voluntarily in some answers given to the PWC study. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP., & School of International Arbitration (Queen Mary, University of London). (2008). 
132 Chukwumerije, O. (1999). 
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arbitration law by bringing it in line with modern trends in arbitration as embodied in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law”.133 Even though the whole Model Law is not enacted, it is clear for 
scholars that there is a strong influence.  
Section 1(c) covers the general principles of the Arbitration Act and it includes one of the 
matters covered by the UNCITRAL Model Law in its Article 5: limit to the interference of the 
court. Astonishingly, one of the general principles is the one limiting the court’s interference to 
the ones expressly provided in the Act.134 This is a huge change from the past because English 
courts used to have a general jurisdiction over ICA and they used it often. This disposition is 
included in order to “ensure that the court's powers were only of a nature as to, and only 
exercised in such a way as to, support arbitration, not interfere with it”.135 This can be 
considered as a small step regarding the evolution seen in Switzerland but it is still important 
because of the strong importance of the jurisdictional theory in England.  
Section 69(1) gives the possibility to exclude appeal on points of law and it is also quite an 
important step towards the autonomous theory of arbitration for England. Even if the appeal is 
not excluded by the will of parties, the appeal is quite limited. Moreover, jurisdictional 
challenges to the Court are limited by time limits and an exhaustive list of possible 
challenges.136 
 
So, the overall goal of the English Arbitration Act is to differentiate litigation and arbitration 
so that the advantages of arbitration can still be sustained. Concerning recognition of the 
autonomous theory of arbitration, arbitration gets more freedom even though it must be stated 
explicitly by parties. However, this freedom must be tasty for the proponents of the autonomous 
theory of arbitration because the British case is coming from far.   
 
3.2.3.2.3.2 Liberal stance of French courts 
In France, transnationalists seem to have won the combat as the case law of the Court of 
Cassation shows it. However, this shift is not supported by national legislation but rather by 
reaction of the Courts.  
One of the first cases showing the liberal stance of French Courts is the Hilmarton case evoked 
above. In this case, a contract of advice and coordination is at stake, this contract is made in 
                                                 
133 Ibidem. 
134 Section 1(c) of the English Arbitration Act 1996: “in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene 
except as provided by this Part.” 
135 Chukwumerije, O. (1999) quoting: Landau, T. T. (1997). 
136 Section 67 and 68 offers the possibility of challenges for jurisdiction and serious irregularity.  
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order to obtain a contract of works in Algeria. The arbitration happened in Geneva and has been 
set aside there. The case which will be analysed here is the enforcement request made by the 
private party before French Courts that went finally before the Court of Cassation. The decision 
of the Court considered that Article VII of the NY Convention allowed the Court of Appeal to 
decide that the set aside award can be recognized because of the more permissive features of 
French law. This case is the first which recognizes international and autonomous character of 
arbitration. The Court held that: “la sentence rendue en Suisse était une sentence internationale 
qui n’était pas intégrée dans l’ordre juridique de cet État”.137 It is a clear and explicit 
acknowledgment of the autonomous character of arbitration. However, scholars of the territorial 
approach considered that decision was “out of its way”.138 
This decision could have been considered a mistake or a sudden imprudence of the Court of 
Cassation if it would not have been validated by further cases which went in the same direction. 
Among them, there have been Chromalloy139 and Putrabali cases140. The tone of the Court is 
the same and it even goes further with the Putrabali case where the award is considered as 
“rattachée à aucun ordre juridique étatique”.141 The same wording is used in Chromalloy case 
and it seems like the French Courts established a stable case law concerning ICA: it is an 
autonomous arbitration which does not have to follow the decision of the place of arbitration. 
Moreover, concerning the possible critics saying that French courts consider it autonomous 
only when it concerns foreign arbitral tribunals, Götaverken case in 1980 must be noticed. In 
this case, the Court of Appeal of Paris “decline[d] jurisdiction to set aside an ICC award 
rendered in Paris on the ground that […] neither the parties nor the contracts, had any 
connection with France, and they had not designated French law”.142 Moreover, France 
recognizes the possibility for non-nationals to waive their right of judicial review in the country 
when choosing France as their place of arbitration.143 
 
                                                 
137 Société Hilmarton Ltd v. Société Omnium de traitement et de valorisation (OTV), 92-15.137. Court of 
Cassation of France, March 23, 1994. “the award rendered in Switzerland is an international award which is not 
integrated into the legal system of that State” (Gaillard’s translation in Gaillard, E. (2012). p.61)  
138 Goode, R. (2001). 
139 Société Hilmarton Ltd v. Société Omnium de traitement et de valorisation (OTV), 92-15.137. Court of 
Cassation of France, March 23, 1994. 
140 Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est Epices, 05-18.053. Court of 
Cassation of France, June 29, 2007. 
141 Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est Epices, 05-18.053. Court of 
Cassation of France, June 29, 2007. (Putrabali). “which is not anchored in any national legal order” (Gaillard’s 
translation in Gaillard, E. (2012). p.63) 
142 Goode, R. (2001). 
143 Article 1522 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
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3.2.3.3 Criticisms 
The autonomous theory of ICA has received the most severe criticisms from the scholarship. 
These criticisms were so comprehensive that it was not even considered as a serious and clear 
theory by some. 
 
3.2.3.3.1 Lack of rationality 
The criticisms concerning the lack of rationality has been made mostly by Ralf Michaels in its 
article named “Dreaming law without a state: scholarship on autonomous international 
arbitration as utopian literature”. In this article, Ralf Michaels mainly criticizes arguments used 
in order to support the thesis of an autonomous arbitration. He considers that “the literature on 
law without a state is replete with dreams, visions and faith”144 and it supposedly “masks a 
poverty of theoretical foundations.”145 
This analysis of the literature supporting the autonomous theory of arbitration is relevant 
because the author is looking for arguments. He supports that at the exact moment where he is 
looking for explanations, he is faced by references to faith, utopia and dream. The first 
paragraph of the article of Julian D.M. Lew146 is characteristic of this scholarship who bases all 
its theory on faith and dreams rather than on rational arguments. Lew’s article is not his only 
argument, he also takes the example of Gaillard who also relies on that faith as the following 
quote show: “these are mental representations, visions of international arbitration that, as such, 
are a matter of belief – if not of faith – and not of scientific truth”.147 This lack of rationality 
could question the feasibility of this theory in practice. Moreover, relying on dreams or faith is 
not a scientific approach to the theory and it undermines all the rest of the scholarship and even 
the purpose of this thesis work.  
 
For these reasons, Michaels’ analysis of the scholarship is quite striking because he is criticizing 
one of the fundamental element of the theory: its legitimacy. However, Michaels is not only a 
sectarian critic of the autonomous theory of arbitration because he agrees that state positivism 
has the same features. State positivism is not a rational theory over the obligatory character of 
national norms but rather a belief on the obligatory character and the effect that a norm passed 
                                                 
144 Michaels, R. (2013).  
145 Ibidem.  
146 Julian D.M. Lew (2006). 
147 Gaillard, E. (2012) p.152 
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through a parliament will have effects on the society. Michaels’ assessment is quite realistic 
and that’s why his criticisms turn into a useful insight. He recognizes the following. 
“When a paradigm shift is needed, it is necessary to try to think outside the 
current paradigm, and that means to move, deliberately or not, to that which 
is not (yet)”148 
However, the fact that state positivism is based on faiths and dreams does not make it a reason 
for the autonomous theory of arbitration to be also based on such elements. It can be argued 
that this paradigm shift needs also a clear and rational explanation.  
The fact that the scholarship sustains all its theory on faith and dreams is considered as “both a 
weakness and a strength at the same time”149 by the author. The weakness is the lack of 
rationality in the process of presentation of the autonomous theory of arbitration because it does 
not give any tools for anyone to consider implementing such theory. However, Michaels sees a 
strength in this strategy because it allows the scholarship “to occupy the space of imagination, 
and to claim it for their own projects.”150 
 
3.2.3.3.2 Lack of realism 
ICA is considered as the most important dispute resolution mechanism of international 
commerce and its importance is such that Gaillard and Paulsson have thought about making 
this dispute resolution detached from the State. However, this statement, classical in ICA, is 
not depicting the reality. At least, this is what Christopher Drahozal and Thomas Dietz show. 
This criticism will relativize ICA and its importance and also push the argument that the 
autonomous theory is useless because the argument is the tiny importance of ICA in reality. 
Contrary to the general assumption dominating the ICA scholarship, ICA is not the general 
dispute resolution mechanism. Indeed, “data on the use of arbitration clauses in international 
contracts, however, provides a more nuanced picture”151, different than what the scholarship is 
implicitly saying. If the figures are to be sought, it appears that 0,2% of US exporting firms 
were involved in ICA in 2009.152  Other figures appear in the articles of Drahozal where it is 
specified that “only 1% or 2% of clauses giving rise to ICC arbitrations from 2000 and 2003 
provided for transnational law”.153 Drahozal takes the example of Eisenberg and Miller 
                                                 
148 Michaels, R. (2013). 
149 Ibidem. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Drahozal, C. R. (2016). 
152 Dietz, T. (2014) p. 174 
153 Drahozal, C. R. (2011).  
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findings154 where there are some contracts in which arbitration clauses are not so attractive. 
Thus, assets sale purchase contracts are comprising only 30,4% of arbitration clauses. It is not 
much. However, Drahozal tends to limit the effects of this study by saying that it is a not a big 
scale study.155 It can still be said that the gathering of different studies shows that ICA is not 
the fundamental element of dispute resolution mechanism of international commerce.156 These 
figures bring an actual criticism: by overestimating the amount that ICA constitutes in 
international trade, these scholars have probably overestimated its problems. The non-
significance of ICA would make their theories off-ground debates. However, this criticism 
cannot be so overreaching because of the actual and clear amounts at stake in ICA. Even though 
there is a small amount of parties which are choosing ICA as a dispute resolution mechanism, 
when they choose, they are most probably multinational corporations, the ones that ICA 
scholars have considered when drafting their theory. 
The other criticism on the lack of realism of the autonomous theory of arbitration is the one 
concerning the natural behaviours of the parties. Dietz shows that typically, it is thought that 
the choice-of-law clauses are taken to “maximize their joint welfare”.157 Dietz, on the contrary, 
proves that, generally, the party with the most bargaining power imposes its own State law or 
even State Court. “From a rational choice point of view, it is clear that parties do no choose the 
law that is most efficient for both parties, but the law that best suits their own interests”.158 That 
is the exact problem that can be found in the scholarship: the belief on the rational behaviour 
of parties without considering differences of bargaining power which brings a different 
rationality to the drafting of the contract. As Michaels said, the utopia that transnationalists are 
trying to build is quickly broken by empirical studies of other scholars. It is one of the reason 
why Michaels said that utopia thinking was a weakness for the proponents of the autonomous 
theory of arbitration.  
Dietz ends his chapters by agreeing that “arbitration works better than litigation in State courts. 
But, on the other hand, ICA seems far away from offering economic agents engaged in global 
commerce a viable universal legal infrastructure”.159 Dietz’s criticism constitutes a very 
                                                 
154 Ibidem. (2016). 
155 Ibid. (2016) “First, the findings are limited to contracts with at least one securities laws—and hence with an 
obligation to make disclosures required by those laws. As a result, the Eisenberg and Miller findings provide 
little information about the use of arbitration clauses in other parts of the world. Second, the findings are 
limited to ‘material contracts’, the only contracts required to be disclosed by SEC rules.” (emphasis added) 
156 Dietz, T. (2014). 
157 Ibidem. p.177 
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159 Dietz, T. (2014) p. 186-187 
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constructive one and he is arguing for a better business-oriented infrastructure which will take 
into consideration the reality of the drafting and bargaining process. 
 
3.2.3.3.3 Lack of democratic control 
Here, we will talk about Claire A. Cutler and her analysis of private power in her famous book 
“Private Power and Global Authority” where she criticizes the autonomous theory of 
arbitration through the general label of private power. One of the grounds on which she 
criticizes it is the lack of democratic control when transnational law is involved.  
Cutler’s analysis is global and does not concern ICA in particular but her criticism still 
embodies the functioning of ICA and its autonomous theory. One of the main assumptions of 
Cutler is that private actors retain power and they are challenging Westphalian organization of 
the world order, but it is not recognized in classical theories of international relations and 
international law.160 She recognizes three trends of the actual governance: juridification, 
pluralism and privatization.161 These trends constitute the transnationalisation of international 
commercial relations and there are two problems that appear with governance. Indeed, 
“conventional theories of international relations (hereinafter ‘IR’) and international law 
(hereinafter ‘IL’) are incapable of capturing these developments”162 and these norms are “not 
subject to democratic methods of scrutiny and review.”163 
 
It is time to consider the main criticism of Cutler regarding the ‘transnational legal order’164, as 
she calls it. The lack of democratic control is the main problem of new transnational norms 
freed from the State. She does not try to stop this evolution but acknowledge only the limits. 
Moreover, this lack of democratic control cannot be widespread because it is not a problem 
according to the mainstream ideology. Indeed, these private entities are considered as “part of 
the realm of ‘apolitical’ and neutral, private economic activity”.165 Cutler means that IR and IL 
theories have operated an “art of separation”166 in which private activities are not considered as 
political subjects. This separation is the one separating economic activities and political 
                                                 
160 Cutler, C. A. (2003) p.2 “These trends are in turn linked to deeper transformations in local and global political 
economies and are challenging conventional understandings of world order.”  
161 Ibidem. 
162 Ibid. 
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165 Ibid. 
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activities – it rendered economic activities harmless, normal, neutral, consensual, and 
efficient.167 
 
This art of separation is harmful for the development of transnational law because it avoids the 
confrontation between transnational norms and a democratic scrutiny and review. For Cutler, 
this problem is real and it ruins the legitimacy of the ‘transnational legal order’ because it is 
important for her to keep the scrutiny over the laws even though they are transnational. She 
thinks that “corporations and private business associations are increasingly functioning 
authoritatively, but this is rendered invisible by an ideology that defines the private sphere in 
apolitical terms”.168 For this very reason, she wants to submit private laws to democratic 
scrutiny. However, she recognizes that the acknowledgement of political relevance of 
transnational law would threaten the role of the State.169 If nothing is done in this regard, the 
problem is the legitimacy of transnational norms because of the inadequacy between theory and 
practice.170 Bringing the Cutlerian criticism of transnational norms to the autonomous theory, 
it appears that Cutler would like to see an external control to arbitration system.  
 
The real criticism of Cutler is based on four liberal myths presented in the first chapter171. She 
wishes IR and IL scholars to combat assumptions that private order is natural, neutral, 
consensual and efficient. Cutler does not oppose efficiency of private orderings but rather the 
natural, neutral and consensual features. These assumptions were not challenged by the 
scholarship and that is the reason why Cutler is states that “the corporation is undertheorized, 
while the state is overtheorized.”172 
Cutler’s criticism seems importance because she does not challenge the reality of transnational 
law but rather its current functioning. It must be more appealing for proponents of autonomous 
theory of arbitration to take into consideration Cutlerian remarks because they tend not to 
destroy the theory but rather to improve it.  
                                                 
167 Ibid. p.54 
168 Ibid. p.242 
169 Ibid. p.256. 
170 Ibid. p.241: “A legitimacy crises exists when there is a disjunction or asymmetry between theory and practice 
that becomes so great that it strains the foundations of the order.” 
171 Ibid. p.54 
172 Ibid. p. 255. 
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3.2.3.3.4 Lack of seriousness 
In this last type of criticism, it is possible to point out challenges which are undermining the 
complete endeavour of the scholarship by saying that the autonomous theory of arbitration is 
no more than a pure marketing for the authors who are generally arbitrators. This criticism is 
quite heavy and questions the real intention of the authors. These kind of criticisms and insights 
have been mostly elucidated by Christopher Drahozal, Ralf Michaels, and Catherine Rogers.  
Rogers considers that the scholarship is composed essentially of the “work of the top 
international arbitration specialists, who use these publications as a form of elite advertising, 
but incidental beneficiaries are other users of the system. These products render the mysterious 
inner workings of the arbitration system more transparent”.173 Even though she does not clearly 
attack autonomous theory of arbitration, she clearly states the value of the scholarship of ICA: 
advertising arbitrators.  
Drahozal brings a clear insight to this process. Referring to Dezalay and Garth’s work174, he 
considers that “scholarly publications on the new law merchant constitute signaling behavior 
by prospective international arbitrators”.175 Considering the importance of confidentiality in 
ICA, he understands the need for advertising to the possible future parties and the only way is 
to do it through publications. Referring to his own statistics176, he tries also to understand the 
reason why the majority of writings which are defined as advertisements are standing for a 
transnational and autonomous theory of arbitration. The main reason put forth by Drahozal is 
to show “legal internationalism”177 and flexibility towards other systems of law. Indeed, “even 
if parties do not want to have their dispute resolved according to principles of transnational law 
[as the evidence discussed above suggests], they may still prefer an arbitrator with a 
transnational outlook and expertise as to a number of legal systems”.178 Though Drahozal does 
not present it as a criticism, the depiction of scholarship as advertisement for authors appear as 
a heavy critic of the whole purpose of the autonomous theory of arbitration. The seriousness of 
the autonomous theory is at stake with this kind of criticism.  
 
  
                                                 
173 Rogers, C. (2006). p.22 
174 Dezalay, Y., Garth, B. G. (1996). 
175 Drahozal, C. A. (2011). 
176 See 3.b.2. Lack of realism 
177 Drahozal, C. A. (2011) quoting: Bond, S. R. (1991).  
178 Ibidem.  
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3.2.3.3.5 Other critics  
The first criticism that can be considered very general but having some consequences on the 
autonomous theory is David Caron’s criticism, mostly specialized in International Investment 
Arbitration but that has some assumptions on ICA and arbitration in general. Caron’s words 
have been brought by Kidane in the context of ICA. Kidane paraphrases Caron in the following 
sentence.  
“International arbitration – be it investment or commercial – is not a 
system; it is a framework”179 
This assumption is a heavy challenge to the very idea of arbitration. Indeed, Kidane completes 
it by saying that international arbitration is “a gap filler – nothing else – but market forces of 
its own have supplied and grown theories and promotional justifications that have become true 
because of repetition”.180 It narrows the understanding of international arbitration and makes 
the research meaningless because, then, ICA does not exist in itself, it is just here to fill the 
gaps.  
 
The other criticism which can be brought is Catherine Rogers’ criticism that has been already 
evoked in the context of advertisement. Rogers wrote a book about the “Ethics in International 
Arbitration” in which she considers the epistemic community that arbitrators constitute and the 
lack of ethical rules in the community181 – she speaks about an ethical no-man’s land.182 Rogers 
is not an opponent to the autonomous theory of arbitration but rather one thinking about the 
consequences of this idea and its possible challenges and criticisms. This is the kind of critics 
that proponents of the autonomous theory of arbitration must take into account in order to 
improve their theory.   
                                                 
179 Kidane, Won L. (2017) p.87 referring to: Caron, D. D. (2009). 
180 Ibidem. p.116 
181 Ibid. p.84 quoting: Rogers, C. A. (2011). “International arbitration operates largely on assumptions of its ability 
and need to self-regulate. Its processes exist largely independent of national legal systems, unregimented by 
national procedural rules.” 
182 Kidane, Won L. (2017) p.83 
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4 Practical problems 
The theoretical background of the discussion on an autonomous ICA has been made in the 
previous chapter. Now, it is time to look at the possible practical achievement of the autonomy 
of international arbitration. In order to be efficient, this chapter will mainly focus on two 
problematic elements towards autonomy: public policy and enforcement.  
Indeed, if the whole arbitration proceeding must be looked at, it can be seen that autonomy 
already applies for a number of elements. Among them, there is the freedom of choice of law, 
either for procedural or substantive law. It is clear in the different arbitration rules.183 Other 
elements of achievement of the autonomy of ICA are the freedom to choose the place, and also 
the possible waiver of right of judicial review in the place of arbitration.184 Thus, ICA is already 
delocalized but not fully autonomous mainly because of two elements which are intertwined: 
problems of public policy and enforcement. 
Enforcement and public policy are the main elements which are precluding ICA to be fully 
autonomous. In fact, these elements are anchoring or trying to anchor the whole procedure to 
the mercy of national courts. That is the reason why only these two elements are going to be 
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4.1 Public policy 
The definition of public policy is not a clear one. However, its function is clear, it is to “reject 
foreign laws or acts that contradict the state’s basic principles of law”.185 Moreover, it also acts 
as a positive element. Thus, the notion of public policy carries both a negative and positive 
function in international arbitration context186.  
In municipal law, public policy is used to “designate ‘imperative’ or mandatory rules from 
which the parties cannot derogate”.187 This is, as Pierre Lalive says it, a notion which changes 
in time and space. Public policy is not an exhaustive list of rules that the award must respect 
but rather a moving and changing core of the legal order of the state. That is the reason why 
Lalive held that public policy must be understood “in concreto”188, not theoretically. For that 
reason, the real content of public policy can be understood only with state laws. This adds an 
unpredictable feature in the ICA context that will be evoked later. 
Public policy intervenes in ICA in two occasions: in the case of one party instigating a court 
procedure to decide the validity of the arbitration agreement or when the winning party is 
wishing to see his arbitral award recognized and enforced in the state where the assets of the 
losing party can be found. This section will mainly focus on the second occasion where the 
public policy issue is at stake even though considerations will be the same if the first occasion 
would have been taken as a basis of analysis. 
When autonomy of the ICA is evoked, it is considered that arbitration will become completely 
unrelated to the state, freed from it. However, the reality is much more complex. The current 
functioning of ICA shows that unpredictability and diversity dominate even though courts have 
tried to simplify public policy concept in ICA. The autonomous theory does not apply for public 
policy issues and its absence brings the question of how it would look as theorized by 
transnationalists. Once imagined as the transnational public policy, this autonomous theory for 
public policy is not considered as flawless. Indeed, there are limits to this new theory even 
though it remains the lesser evil.   
 
4.1.1 Current functioning of public policy exception in ICA 
The current functioning of ICA does not permit to call it autonomous because of its lack of 
autonomy on two elements including the public policy issue. This lack of autonomy is clear 
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even though States have tried to smooth the public policy exception through the distinction 
between national public policy and international public policy while the NY Convention 
encouraged this development. However, the international public policy doctrine is not sufficient 
and creates problems.  
 
4.1.1.1 Notion of “international public policy”  
As said above, States are keeping the recognition and enforcement part of ICA and it allows 
them to judicially review awards. Article V(2)(b) of the NY Convention allows the State of 
enforcement to review the award regarding its own public policy. However, States’ arbitration-
friendly stance has kept them from using this article as a blank cheque. There has not been a lot 
of abuses concerning the use of public policy as an excuse for parochial views from the Court. 
Indeed, the scholarship agrees on the fact that this is mostly a theoretical problem.189 This 
behaviour can be seen through major countries having distinguished their national public policy 
and their international public policy. The international public policy of a State can be defined 
as the core values of the legal order of the State “that must be maintained for the preservation 
of the legal and social order”.190 It is a limited version of the actual national public policy that 
is considered as fitting the special needs of international trade. Indeed, ICA cannot be treated 
as a national arbitration because of its scale and the number of countries involved. Moreover, 
party autonomy applied in international trade is completely different and does not ground itself 
on any state’s legal order and for that reason, it is not possible to impose all mandatory rules of 
the State of enforcement. So, most States are now imposing a lighter public policy review over 
foreign arbitral awards.  
This distinction is present in most countries in either law or case law. The first example is 
French law which is among the most liberals in ICA. Article 1514 of its Code of Civil Procedure 
held that foreign arbitral awards are recognized or enforced only if the existence of this award 
is proven and if the latter is not infringing international public policy.191 Along with France, 
Italy, Spain, and Belgium are also recognizing this difference.192 In United States, there is also 
                                                 
189 “public policy seems to be more important in theory rather than in the practice of ICA. Only in very limited 
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this distinction, which has been developed by case law as in other countries apart from France. 
Thus, the basis of the concept has been developed with the case Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 
where the American judge clearly stated that the refusal of enforcement in this case would be 
clearly parochial and would damage party autonomy and the wealth of international trade.193 
Indeed, the judge refused to apply the Securities Act in this case and made the international 
arbitration “subject to less restrictive standards of enforcement than those in purely domestic 
situations”.194 This case law was clearly confirmed in Mitsubishi case195 where antitrust claims 
were made arbitrable even though national parties are not allowed to arbitrate such public laws. 
Scholars agree on the fact that, for the purpose of being arbitration-friendly, States are more 
and more “reduc[ing] the scope of public policy exceptions when dealing with ICA”.196 
However, it must be noted that there are exceptions as China and its article 213(3) of the Civil 
Procedure of 2008 which held that: “If a people’s court determines that the enforcement of an 
arbitration award would contradict the social and public interest, it shall make a ruling of not to 
enforce the award”. This concept seems to cover much more compared to what normal public 
policy would cover. For example, the famous case concerning an arbitration initiated by U.S. 
musical performers who were not paid in China for their performance is striking. The arbitration 
awarded them damages but in the enforcement process, Chinese courts refused to recognize 
and enforce this award because it was against ‘the social and public interest’ of China. However, 
this case is old and it appears that Chinese courts would not decide the same nowadays, even 
though they have the grounds to do it.197 
 
4.1.1.2 Role of the New York Convention 
Concerning the role of the NY Convention in the public policy, an analysis of Article V must 
be made. Indeed, this article is the one listing elements that would probably justify a refusal for 
recognition and enforcement. In this regard, it is possible to divide this list in two: the arguments 
                                                 
193 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506. Supreme Court of the United States, June 17, 1974. The 
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July 2, 1985. 
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that can constitute a ground for refusal in case it is argued by one party who brings the evidence 
with him and the arguments that can be used by the judged without the parties’ will. 
The arguments that can be brought by parties with evidence of its claim are incapacity, lack of 
fairness, excess of jurisdiction, improper composition of the arbitral tribunal, and set aside or 
suspended award.198 The court can bring the questions of arbitrability and public policy.199 It is 
not difficult to understand the reasons why these arguments are divided as such. The underlying 
reason is to prevent State courts to use parochial reasons to refuse recognition and enforcement. 
In that sense, it can be said that “the New York Convention was based upon a liberal policy 
favouring the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards”.200 This liberal stance of 
the NY Convention is clear because of its limitation of grounds for refusal, but Article V(2)(b) 
constitutes an exception regarding the rest of Article V.  
This public policy ground is considered “a loophole”.201 Is it so? Considering the overall NY 
Convention, there is a liberal implied point of view in order to prevent State courts to be 
parochial. However, public policy has been brought in order to allow further grounds because, 
otherwise, grounds in Article V(1) are substantially constitutive of a public policy exception. 
A realistic approach of the drafting process shows that this article can be considered rather as a 
safeguard against the unforeseen. Without this loophole, it is possible to think that the NY 
Convention could not have been so massively ratified.  
Thus, the NY Convention has given some leeway to States to deal with unforeseen cases in 
order to legally deny recognition and enforcement. This loophole, however, has not been really 
used widely and is almost not used nowadays. Indeed, as seen below, the State parties have 
decided to interpret this article in a liberal way and brought the concept of an international 
public policy along with their national public policy.  
 
4.1.1.3 Problems of the current functioning 
There are two problems of the current functioning: the problem that international public policy 
constitutes in itself and also the barrier that it constitutes to the expansion of the autonomous 
theory. In this part, these two problems are going to be studied in order to show the need of an 
autonomous theory in the context of public policy issue.  
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The first problem of the actual functioning of public policy issue is the lack of predictability. 
As said before, international public policy is not truly international.202 The concept of 
international public policy is as domestic as private international law, a domestic solution for 
cross-border disputes which is not taking into account the whole implications of cross-border 
dispute because it is a national decision. Another country can have another international public 
policy and it constitutes a problem of predictability for parties to ICA because they do not know 
what to expect before knowing in which countries are the assets of the losing party.  
This lack of predictability is showed by the problem of the chancellor’s foot as expressed by 
Paulsson.203 The problem of the chancellor’s foot is defined as such: “judicial dissimulation of 
secret preferences under the raiment of high-sounding principle”.204 This constitutes a real 
problem because it undermines the trust of businesses towards the system of enforcement made 
by the NY Convention. In this actual system, it is clear that, under the name of international 
public policy, State courts can apply parochial views. This kind of deviation is always possible 
unless an autonomous concept of public policy exists.  
 
The other problem created by international public policy is the continuing reliance on State 
courts. As said above, this problem constitutes both a barrier to the autonomous theory and an 
actual problem of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Indeed, reliance on State courts is a 
problem especially when the rest of the arbitration is so autonomous that it gives the false 
impression that the project of autonomy is almost achieved. However, the fact that States keep 
the most important part, the one dealing with limitations of the ICA process in order for it to be 
legitimate, is a tremendous barrier to the realization of the autonomy. 
 
4.1.2 Theory of a transnational public policy  
In the general theory of an autonomous ICA, the question of public policy has been studied 
extensively. Among the most famous scholars who wrote about it, Paulsson and Gaillard can 
be found, but also Pierre Lalive, who wrote an extensive report about the question of the 
existence of a transnational public policy. In this part, the question of how the scholars have 
imagined the transnational public policy is going to be answered.  
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The first assessment of scholars about the current functioning of public policy issue in the 
context of ICA is that it is not working properly. Garcia explains the emergence of transnational 
public policy due to the failure of the current system.205 Thus, failures of the current functioning 
of public policy issue brought the concept of transnational public policy which is thought to be 
versatile, consensual, self-regulatory and capable to resist to any challenges.  
In the theory of autonomous arbitration, the public policy is transnational or “truly 
international” as Lalive would say.206 One of the features of this transnational public policy is 
its fundamental versatility. In this regard, transnational public policy is close to national public 
policy. A public policy, as the core values of a legal order, must be versatile and able to change 
according to time and context. This versatility is also useful in order to “address unforeseen 
legal problems”.207 Like the national public policy, the transnational public policy is not either 
an exhaustive list of rules and is rather core values of the transnational legal order. Indeed, 
Ghodoosi clearly states that “any form of public policy inevitably should stem from a legal 
order”.208  
 
Secondly, this transnational public policy is considered consensual due to its method of 
discovery which is the “transnational rules method”.209 This method, systematized by Gaillard 
can already be found in Lalive’s report when he defines transnational public policy as the “basis 
of values endorsed by the international community”.210 Considering the sum of legal orders in 
the world, the method allows to look at emerging trends and to consider them part of the 
transnational public policy while parochial views must be ignored. Gaillard compares it to 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in order to bring legitimacy to his 
method which is not only coming from his imagination on how to achieve the dream211 of an 
autonomous arbitration.212 This majoritarian principle is possible to achieve because of the 
high-level harmonization in Europe and the continuing reconciliation between common law 
and civil law. In this order, Gaillard and Lalive do not rely on off-ground principles in order to 
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constitute substantive content of the transnational public policy but rather a clever mixture of 
the most accepted principles constituting international public policy of different states. Lalive 
concedes that “the respective domains of ‘classical’ international public policy of States and of 
transnational public policy largely coincide, each of them “feeding” so to speak the other or 
others”213 while admitting, at the same time, the “particular or even selfish character”214 of 
international public policy of States. Indeed, transnational public policy is as narrow as 
international public policy or even more because it “requires the acknowledgment of a rare 
degree of consensus”.215 
  
The last feature of transnational public policy is its self-regulatory character. With the 
application of transnational public policy, the arbitral award will be checked according to its 
own specific transnational public policy. As it is self-regulatory, it also implies that the 
arbitrator knows the elements considered during judicial review before national courts, so he 
can write his award knowing the criteria. This self-regulatory and transnational public policy 
simplifies the stage of going to the national court because, then, the process is not unpredictable. 
Pierre Lalive analyses in details the questions of how this transnational public policy will be 
applied. He concedes that judges are not really able to use the exact terminology because of 
their limitations in the legal order of the State but he does not seem to take that element seriously 
because, for Lalive, it is possible to evoke private international law principles and implicitly 
apply a transnational public policy. Lalive’s proposal is the exact opposite of the problem of 
the Chancellor’s foot evoked by Paulsson.216 
 
Finally, Lalive argues that transnational public policy, that already exists according to him, is 
capable of responsing to its critics in several points. Concerning the vagueness of the concept, 
he argues that national public policy is also vague because of its very nature: “it is a malleable 
concept”.217 This criticism would probably come from statists. Indeed, Lalive takes into account 
criticisms concerning the limit to party autonomy that it would constitute. He does not refute it 
but adds that “it is hardtop see how it could be an additional restriction”.218 Then, he argues that 
the main reason for the restriction is to maintain legitimacy of the arbitration process even 
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though it is an autonomous one. Indeed, an autonomous arbitration freed completely from the 
State but without any legitimacy is useless. This autonomist position is already criticized for its 
lack of democratic accountability and its control by multinational corporations.219 For that 
specific reason, transnational public policy which suits specific needs of cross-border disputes 
and, at the same time, respect the will of the majority of states’ international public policy is a 
proper way to maintain legitimacy of the general theory. However, there are some other 
challenges that can be evoked from the point of view of the autonomous arbitration theory such 
as lack of ambition and the fundamentally unpredictable character of State courts.  
 
4.1.3 Challenges and contextualization of the problem 
The autonomous consideration of public policy is facing several challenges that constitute 
another problem in the path towards the possibility of an autonomous ICA. In this regard, two 
challenges can be evoked: absence of a private regulation concerning public policy exception, 
and a clear lack of ambition because it continues to rely on State courts. However, these critics 
are no constructive because the existence of a system lacking any defaults is not possible. 
Indeed, there is no alternative as Margaret Thatcher would say.  
 
4.1.3.1 Absence of a private regulation 
The first challenge is about non-reliance of transnational public policy on private entities. This 
is a criticism that can be made because, then, arbitration would not be fully autonomous if the 
transnational public policy is fully implemented. Thus, the question that can be asked is about 
the ability of private entities to regulate arbitration with the public policy exception. Indeed, is 
this challenge a real one?  
If the concept of public policy must be looked through the lenses of law and economics, it has 
three functions: protecting parties, non-parties and achieving redistributive justice.220 Indeed, 
the State’s role is the protect people and one of the means is law and public policy as limits to 
private activities. For example, in domestic law, people are free to contract within the limits of 
public policy. The same must be applied to cross-border commercial arbitration. Unlimited 
freedom for multinational corporations would mean lesser freedom for some parts of the 
population and an illegitimate system.221 In this regard, the role of the State is crucial because 
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it is considered as a neutral institution in the domestic context and as the only one which can 
limit parties. However, what is the situation in cross-border trade? Especially in the context of 
ICA, can parties arbitrate every matter? They should not be allowed because then, the rule of 
law would be infringed.  
The primary question regarding the functions of public policy in this context is whether it would 
be possible to give them to private entities. Is it possible to rely on the only arbitrator to respect 
transnational public policy so that arbitration becomes truly autonomous? If law and economics 
approach is used, private entities are considered following their profits and so the arbitrators 
who are private adjudicators. Self-regulation would then give a public mission to a private entity 
and the sole profit-seeking private entities are not going to be able to properly apply public 
policy which is a matter of rule of law. Differences between an arbitrator and a judge are clearly 
showed by Claire A. Cutler in the following sentence: “While judges operate as part of the 
public sphere and are duty-bound to protect unrepresented public interests, private arbitrators 
are not: their duties go to resolving the differences of the parties before them”222. Here, the 
arbitrator is not bound to serve justice but its duty is to solve disputes between the parties. 
Thinking about the global justice is not in his interest nor in his mandate.  
It is not possible to think about a private implementation of public policy exception because of 
the lack of neutrality and damages it can bring to international rule of law. William W. Park 
has defined this problem through the following dichotomy: it is either finality of the award or 
fairness of the award.223 In this regard, transnational public policy implemented by national 
courts seems to be the lesser evil choice regarding the autonomy theory of arbitration. Indeed, 
the autonomous theory of arbitration must be legitimate in regard of the rule of law, otherwise, 
it would be considered as the dictatorship of multinational corporations.  
 
4.1.3.2 Lack of ambition 
The theory of transnational public policy can also be challenged on the ground that it lacks 
change and does not think of any other alternatives beyond impossible self-regulation and 
reliance on unpredictable State courts. When looking at the general literature of transnational 
law, there is a minority of scholars who is standing for the creation of an international court 
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which would solve “disputes concerning the enforceability of international commercial 
arbitration awards”.224 
This international court would apply “provisions of international public policy, rather than 
attempt to discover and effectuate the public policy of any particular State”.225  This Court 
would solve most of the problems and challenges of both actual and prospective public policy 
for cross-border disputes. Indeed, an international court would prevent parochial views while 
public policy would be in the hands of a judiciary which would rather serve justice than parties. 
When Cutler talks about the scope of both private and public international law, she says that 
the liberal myth associates public international law “with unnatural activities such as dumping, 
cartels, subsidies, price supports, and the like” while private international law is associated with 
“normal and natural economic activities”.226 This liberal division corresponds perfectly with 
the need of an international court. Non-compliance and public policy infringement can also be 
seen as ‘unnatural’ regarding international commercial arbitration and its statistics.  
 
However, this decision of making an international court is the continuing theory of state 
positivism which denies political power from multinational corporations.227 This denial is not 
satisfying for international trade and that is also the reason why autonomous theory of 
arbitration is also fighting for. With an autonomous theory subject to a last review by the State 
regarding transnational public policy, multinational corporations are going to be the builders of 
this arbitral legal order along with major law firms. This would increase the responsibility of 
such stakeholders because parochial arguments would not be available anymore in case of 
problems. Indeed, this would bring clarity in the relation between private power and State 
control. It would be a controlled interference which would solely bring legitimacy and limits to 
the arbitration proceedings in terms of rule of law.  
 
Furthermore, the idea of creating an international court is quite common in legal scholarship 
and especially for environment issues.228 However, this classic international law of legislating 
through conventions is outdated and impractical. It is not possible now for such a big amount 
of States to bind themselves to such a heavy commitment which would oblige states to enforce 
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foreign arbitral awards without passing through their own national courts. The NY Convention 
was successful because of its loophole and its general pro-business point of view while the 
commitment asked from States was not so high.  
 
So, transnational public policy is the lesser evil choice which suits the needs of international 
trade while still relying on State courts and their unpredictability. There seems to be no better 
solution than transnational public policy bringing legitimacy and rule of law in ICA.    
However, it seems that the ‘dream’229 of an arbitration completely delinked from the State has 
found its first obstacle. However, this obstacle is better with transnational public policy because 
even though it does not fit well with the autonomous idea which was about to abandon any links 
with the state, this solution is realistic and practically autonomous. However, it would be 
interesting to see whether enforcement issues constitute also an obstacle.  
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4.2 Enforcement 
In this section, the question will be limited to enforcement and not the traditional ‘recognition 
and enforcement’. Indeed, this terminology is used as if it was a sole concept but recognition is 
a completely different topic which serves other arbitration cases or a case before a national 
court. For this reason, recognition will not be analyzed. 
Enforcement is the process by which the Court is forcing parties to comply with a national 
court’s decision or an arbitral award. As the State has police powers, it can force parties or even 
take their assets with the threat of force in order to ensure compliance. To look at the 
enforcement issue in ICA, the current functioning must be analyzed and studied. This study 
will allow the introduction of the theory of self-enforcement system and challenges to its fully 
implementation in ICA. 
 
4.2.1 Current functioning of the question of enforcement 
The current functioning of the enforcement system constitutes a problem for the autonomous 
theory of arbitration. Thus, enforcement is supposed to be harmonized with the role that the 
New York Convention play. However, the determining actors in the enforcement process are 
still national courts. For that reason, the enforcement system is still considered unpredictable 
and parochial by the scholarship.  
 
4.2.1.1 The role of the New York Convention  
If the role of the New York Convention is to be considered, three elements must be analyzed: 
absence of a requirement of double exequatur, prima facie recognition and enforcement and 
use of limited grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement.   
The first important role of the New York Convention in the recognition and enforcement 
procedure before national courts is the removal of the double exequatur requirement. The 
double exequatur requirement forced parties who wanted to enforce their awards to get an 
exequatur from the national court of the place of arbitration showing that the place of arbitration 
recognized arbitration proceedings and the award. Once this exequatur obtained, the party who 
wanted to enforce the award had to go before the national court of the place where he sought 
recognition and enforcement in order to make this award enforced with the help of the previous 
exequatur. Thus, the party who wanted to enforce an arbitral award had to receive two “leave 
for enforcement”230 from two national courts and it was considered a burdensome procedure. 
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This double exequatur was made possible by previous international conventions on 
international arbitration which required an award to be final.231 However, the NY Convention 
does not require such finality but a sole binding award.232 In this regard, it can be said that the 
majority of scholars have agreed on a single interpretation of this binding award: “there seems 
to be a consensus among national courts that the term ‘binding’ does not require the party 
seeking enforcement of an award first to obtain leave for enforcement in the country where the 
award was rendered”.233 Concerning the positive interpretation of what ‘binding’ means, there 
are four approaches to the ‘binding’ approach as written in the article of Freyer and Gharavi.  
The other role that the New York Convention had was one “provid[ing] the obligation of 
national courts to enforce foreign awards and harmoniz[ing] the grounds for the refusal of 
recognition and enforcement”.234 Article IV states that, for recognition and enforcement, the 
party must bring “(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; (b) 
The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof”235. These 
elements have been considered by national courts as sufficient to have a prima facie recognition 
and enforcement.236 
 
Moreover, concerning grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement, Article V is clear 
and exhaustive and also quite different from the Geneva Convention. Article I of the Geneva 
Convention used to require five cumulative conditions in order for recognition and enforcement 
to occur. In the NY Convention, the process is reversed and the conditions are made to deny 
recognition and enforcement. The Geneva Convention was using two ways of limiting the scope 
of recognition and enforcement: cumulative conditions for the approval and a non-exhaustive 
list of grounds for denial. Article III of the Geneva Convention authorizes parties to bring other 
arguments for denying recognition and enforcement. The objective of the NY Convention is 
different, it was made to “facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to the 
greatest extent possible and to provide a maximum level of control which Contracting States 
may exert over arbitral awards”.237 Moreover, these five grounds are not mandatory to the 
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extent that the goal of the national court is to facilitate the recognition and enforcement238. 
Article VII can be an explanation of how the convention allowed for State parties to expand 
their right in order to have a more favorable policy towards foreign arbitral awards. It must be 
noted that the NY Convention does not evoke any review of the merits and Article V is looking 
only at arbitration proceedings. 
To finish with the NY Convention, its main objectives can be defined as facilitating recognition 
and enforcement and limiting the dominance of parochial views in national courts where 
recognition and enforcement is sought. Did the theoretical objectives of the NY Convention 
change the way the recognition and enforcement is practiced? 
 
4.2.1.2 Unpredictability and lack of a harmonization 
How does recognition and enforcement work in practice? This question has been too much 
invaded by biased views and that is why this section is trying to bring some empirical studies 
in order to see the real practice of businesses. The basis of the empirical evidence chosen in this 
section can be found in Brekoulakis’ article.239 To show the practice of ICA in the enforcement 
branch, Brekoulakis uses empirical evidences from two different surveys and comment them.240   
One of the first figure he gives in his article is 40% of settlements in the post-award stage with 
discounted damages compared to the original. The study shows that 35% of these settlements 
include a discount between 76% and 100% from the original damages. These figures do not 
show any confidence on the current system of enforcement and Brekoulakis states that “ideally, 
there should be no reason for an award-creditor (presumably the winner in the arbitration) not 
to seek to recover the full value of the award through enforcement”.241 As a conclusion of these 
figures, one would think that enforcement procedure before national courts is so bad that 
businesses prefer to get discounted awards through post-award settlements than to try to enforce 
their awards which, in this case, would be costlier. 
Brekoulakis studies, for this reason, the real practice of enforcement stage before national 
courts. He concludes that “enforcement proceedings are more efficient than parties perceive 
them to be”. The survey gives 43% of proceedings which are completed between six months 
and one year. In the European Union, this figure is much more impressive because 100% of 
                                                 
238 “In accordance with this objective, the Convention grants courts of the Contracting States the discretion to 
refuse to recognize and enforce an award on the grounds listed in article V, without obligating them to do so” in 
NEW YORK CONVENTION GUIDE. Article V. 
239 Brekoulakis, S. (2008). 
240 Misteles, L., & Baltag, C. (2008).  
241 Brekoulakis, S. (2008). 
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enforcement cases are resolved within a year. This is an “alarming finding, indicating that 
award-debtors are allowed room to abuse the enforcement system”242. Indeed, these figures 
show that enforcement stage is working properly but that businesses are not considering it that 
way because they rather prefer to get less damages through a quicker and more flexible way: 
settlement. However, Brekoulakis points out the bias that this mismatch of perception and 
reality produces. When the system fails, the losers in arbitration become winners.  
The reasons for such wrong perception of ICA are clear and underscored by scholarship 
literature. Even though it does not correspond to empirical studies, the perception of the 
enforcement system has some grounds, even if it is residual, in the reality of State courts which 
are generally slow, unpredictable and mostly adversarial.243 
State courts are slow because of their procedural constraints. It is one of the problems businesses 
are afraid of. Commerce does not fit well with the procedural constraints of national courts. 
Even if empirical evidences show that they are not so slow, it became a dogma for businesses 
that courts are slow and will remain slow. Indeed, one of the element that make them think that 
way is the importance that procedure law has in state courts. Moreo, with the economic crisis 
of 2008, the budget given to State courts generally decreased.244 This decrease is producing 
slow justice in the country and degradation of the business relationship because longer a case 
is pending, longer is the threat to the business relationship between the parties.   
These procedural constraints make businesses think that State courts are unpredictable. For this 
matter, enforcement of set aside awards operated after a new interpretation of Article V and VII 
of the NY Convention is a tangible evidence of their unpredictability. These articles were 
thought to be mandatory grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement but it turned out 
that State courts emphasized on the use of “may” in Article V and also on the significance of 
Article VII. This interpretation allowed recognition and enforcement of set aside awards as 
French courts did. This trend just appeared in 1973 with the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands245 giving effect to a set-aside Swiss international award. Even though it started in 
the field of international investment law, this case law influenced ICA and appeared in it.246 
                                                 
242 Ibidem.  
243 “enforcement proceedings are perceived as inherently adversarial, which can potentially undermine long-
standing business relationships” in Brekoulakis, S. (2008). 
244 The main example is the State of California in the U.S. where “drastic cuts in the budget of the judicial branch” 
have been carried out. See in Cuniberti, G. (2017). p.186 
245 Société Européenne d’Études et d’Entreprises (SEEE)  v. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands, October 26, 1973. Reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1974, no. 361. see Gaillard, 
E. (2013). p.137 
246 Court of Cassation, June 29, 2007, 1st Civil Chamber, PT Putrabali Adyimulia v. Rena Holding. 
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These changes brought unpredictability in arbitration proceedings because the party who won 
the challenge in the place of arbitration found himself forced to enforce the award and pay 
damages. Even if this new case law is beneficial from the autonomous theory perspective, it 
shows how the construction of case-law allows for a loss in legal security.  
The last problem of perception, which is not even a residual problem of State courts is their 
basic adversarial feature. It cannot be otherwise because it is a judicial tribunal and it does not 
consider the goals of the business community who is not to get the exact amount of damages 
they have been awarded but rather keeping their reputation and their business with the other 
party. This inadequacy between the expectations of businesses and State courts is the very 
reason for the existence of ICA and the reliance on State courts for enforcement shows the 
persistence of this mismatch. 
Even if residual in practice, the problem of relying on State courts during enforcement is both 
theoretical and perceptional and must be answered by a new theory. This theory is embodied in 
the autonomous theory of arbitration: self-enforcement. 
 
4.2.2 Theory of self-enforcement system in ICA 
The possibility of self-enforcement is increased with the residual problems appearing in the 
enforcement stage of ICA. As said above, current problems come from a lack of business-
oriented State courts. What does the business community need? Flexibility, speed, non-
adversarial proceedings and efficient enforcement. Is there already such a system that challenge 
State courts in the enforcement stage? There is the self-enforcement system widespread in 
specialized arbitration and this part of the thesis will study the possibility of a generalization of 
the theory of self-enforcement.  
 
4.2.2.1 Needs of the business community 
As said above, the business community has some specific needs due to the features of 
commerce. Flexibility, speed, and non-adversarial proceedings are present in arbitration 
proceedings due to the expansion of the autonomous theory of arbitration. However, ICA is not 
completely autonomous and problems of State interference appear still in some areas including 
the enforcement of arbitration. It constitutes a problem because the rest of the arbitration 
proceedings are free from these inadequacies and correspond to the needs of the business 
community but not the last part, enforcement, which is the most important because it is the 
implementation of the autonomously-made decision.  
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Thomas Dietz shows this problem in an original way in his article247 by stating that “clearly, 
arbitration works better than litigation in state courts. But, on the other hand, ICA seems far 
away from offering economic agents engaged in global commerce a viable universal legal 
infrastructure”.248 By that sentence, he means that adjudication fails in some points as the 
interference of courts on the enforcement stage.  
This problem cannot be compared to public policy issues which concerned rule of law and 
democratic review of awards. In enforcement case, the State court is only used as a mean to 
implement the award. Then, there is no superior principle anchoring the enforcement issue to 
the control of State courts. In this order, the generalization of the specialized arbitration can be 
theoretically thought and proposed to correct the problems of lack of autonomy on that stage.  
 
4.2.2.2 Generalization of the self-enforcement doctrine 
Specialized arbitration has always taken a different place in the legal scholarship and has never 
been assimilated to ICA. The whole procedure is completely different and specialized 
arbitration is truly autonomous. In this part, the purpose of the thesis is not to say that they are 
similar. On the contrary, the purpose is to clearly try to propose a generalization of the self-
enforcement doctrine that is already implemented in specialized arbitration. For that reason, the 
functioning of the specialized arbitration will be studied first in order to, in a second time, 
propose a generalization of this functioning self-enforcement system. 
 
4.2.2.2.1 Self-enforcement doctrine in specialized arbitration 
Specialized arbitration has some different features that separates itself from mainstream ICA. 
The most known features are their own substantial and formal rules of arbitration. Specialized 
arbitration is mostly an arbitration system which belongs to a special trade association where 
members are very close. Thus, the trade association precedes the arbitration system and it is an 
important feature of specialized arbitration.  
The analysis of specialized arbitration will limit itself to the study of their enforcement 
procedure which is quite different from what happens in ICA. First, enforcement is not based 
on the sole dichotomy between the voluntary compliance and the assistance of national courts. 
The voluntary compliance is the basic and most of the parties are voluntarily complying. In 
case of non-compliance, the specialized arbitration institution foresees some private 
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248 Ibidem. p.186-187 
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enforcement or self-enforcement systems which allows the institution to order the award-debtor 
to pay damages and execute the award. This self-enforcement system is insured by a reputation-
based system. If the party is not complying after a notice, his name will be publicly disclosed 
as a non-compliant party. This type of reputation-based enforcement can only work in case of 
a strong trade association which could prevent the good functioning of the non-compliant 
party’s business. For example, in the diamond industry, the famous New York Diamond 
Dealer’s Club is constituted of the biggest stakeholders of the business and outside of this club, 
it is rather difficult to continue the business normally.249 Brekoulakis summarizes this feature 
as follow: “Any corporations not abiding by these commercial rules will be at risk of suffering 
business sanctions which can be more dire than many sanctions of legal nature”.250 This special 
self-regulation can only work in case of an organized trade association which can put this 
pressure on the award-debtor’s business. Otherwise, the self-regulation system would not work. 
Indeed, private sanctions must have more impact on the award-debtor than legal sanctions251. 
This power is generally ensued from the importance of reputation in these fields and also from 
the solidarity between members. It means that if the award-debtor does not comply with the 
award, his name is going to be showed in public (online or in the office). If the non-compliance 
continues, the sanctions are going to be either suspension or expulsion from the association and 
that would mean a significant loss because this sanction means a lot for other members.252 The 
perfect examples of these associations are the Grain and Feed Trade Association, the Diamond 
Dealer’s Club and the cotton industry in Manchester. However, to try to imitate such specialized 
arbitration, some elements regarding the market and its organization must be taken into 
consideration. Moreover, the actual market value of trust of reputation must be assessed before 
such an enterprise of generalization.  
 
This self-regulation system works properly because it transforms economic incentives to enter 
into the trade association into arms against the non-compliant party. Moreover, actual 
dominance of the trade association and its members in the specific market concerned are also 
elements that must not be undermined.  
                                                 
249 Bernstein, L. (2009). 
250 Brekoulakis, S. (2008). 
251 This type of trade association can be accused of infringing competition or antitrust laws of the country where 
they are incorporated. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission has a constant eye on the New York Diamond 
Dealer’s Club. See Bernstein, L. (2009).  
252 “Their non-compliance quickly becomes known throughout the merchant communities and the mill typically 
finds itself either unable to purchase cotton, or able to purchase it only at a relatively high price or for cash prior 
to delivery”. See Bernstein, L. (2001).  
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4.2.2.2.2 Generalization of the self-enforcement doctrine 
In order to complete the autonomous theory of arbitration, the enforcement system must be 
made autonomous from State courts. This part is going to make a plea for a generalized self-
enforcement in ICA and assess its possibility according to the criteria invoked before.  
Before to think about the possibility of a self-enforcement system, an assessment must be made 
of how it would look to have ICA with a self-enforcement system. It would mean that arbitration 
proceedings would see only the obstacle of public policy in front of State courts and no other 
interference from the national level. As said above, this sole interference would be in order to 
anchor autonomous ICA in its own legit legal order. Parties would be able to choose their own 
procedure, substantive law, place of arbitration and not be constrained by parochial national 
laws. Moreover, the parties would not have to worry about the end of the process because 
reputation-based self-enforcement procedure would deal with the enforcement of their awards. 
The State courts would be exceptional as thought by Paulsson.253 
Concerning the possibility of implementing such a self-enforcement system in ICA, a new 
international trade association gathering most of the stakeholders of international trade in order 
to have a bargaining power over award-debtors is needed. Moreover, an efficient system of 
reputation-based would be needed, a rule, like in the New York Diamond Dealer’s Club254, 
which would organize the publication of the name of non-compliant party in order for other 
traders to know with whom they can make deals with. It would not be a formal boycott of the 
trader but rather an efficiency-based boycott in the sense that no traders would deal with the 
non-compliant one for the very reason that he is not a reliable partner.255 The scale of 
international trade makes it hard to have a personal reputation system and for that reason, an 
IT-based reputation database would have to be implemented. This IT-based system is what the 
Diamond Dealer’s Club is starting to do due to new heterogeneity of the industry in the last 
years256 
                                                 
253 Paulsson, J. (2013). p.46 
254 Bernstein, L. (2009) 
255 “dispute resolution mechanisms that aim at providing a viable legal infrastructure for modern globalized 
markets with high numbers of impersonal market participants need to be supported By either coercive state 
sanctions or systems of organized blacklisting”. See Dietz, T. (2014) p. REFERENCE NEEDED 
256 “IT-base regimes lower barriers to entry by reducing an individual’s cost of informing others about his 
reputation”. in Bernstein, L. (2009).  
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This generalization must work properly because “the private regime must be Pareto superior to 
the established legal regime in order to survive”.257 If the system is not working, there is going 
to be an automatic shift towards the State enforcement. As said before, the problems of State 
enforcement are only residual and fictional258 and it is expected from the new system of self-
enforcement to be only better or it would not work. Normally, this system assisted by adequate 
economic sanctions should trump legal sanctions and make the State enforcement irrelevant 
because self-enforcement would be quicker, more efficient, and amicable. If these new 
sanctions are more prohibitive for businesses, shift to self-enforcement may be a success. 
However, this proposition is faced with challenges and other empirical evidences.  
 
4.2.3 Challenges to the self-enforcement doctrine 
Self-enforcement can be implemented in the field of ICA but there are some challenges to it. 
The reasons why it would be possible were studied above, but now, in this part, possible 
challenges must be studied in order to assess the possibility of implementing the self-
enforcement doctrine in ICA. The main challenges are the scale and the complexity of ICA but 
also the inherent advantage of State courts which allow them to still matter in the landscape of 
enforcement. 
 
4.2.3.1 Scale of ICA 
International Commercial Arbitration is a big scale adjudication system, all types of commercial 
acts from all around the world can be subject to arbitration. When compared to specialized 
arbitration, the latter is either limited in matters or in place. The perfect examples are cotton 
and diamond industries259 which are limited in their matters. Specialized arbitration works so 
well precisely because of the limited amount of cases they receive. These two limitations are 
not present in ICA because it is all commercial cases around the world. In this regard, the scale 
of ICA constitutes an apparent challenge to the implementation of the self-enforcement 
system.260  
The main argument behind the limitations to specific matters and places is the impossibility to 
deal with such a big scale system through self-enforcement system. As said before, specialized 
arbitration works properly because its limited number of stakeholders are represented in the 
                                                 
257 Bernstein, L. (2009) 
258 Mainly in the perception that the business community have, see Brekoulakis, S. (2008) 
259 See Bernstein, L. (2001 ;2009) 
260 Drahozal, C. R. (2009) 
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trade association which makes arbitration. Moreover, outside this trade association, it is much 
more difficult to make business in this field. However, in ICA, there is no such association and 
that would be problematic to try to establish one ex nihilo without the particular link between 
the traders. It is certain that diamond traders share the same business and this same business 
pushed them to create a trade association and make a common arbitration system. In ICA, the 
process would be reversed for the sole purpose of getting the advantages of specialized 
arbitration. This ex nihilo creation would not work properly because of its biased start: the 
enforcement system work because there is already a trade association which contains most of 
the stakeholders of the field. The fictional reconstitution of the specialized arbitration system 
can hardly work. 
 
4.2.3.2 Complexity of ICA 
The second challenge is mostly linked to the first: ICA is not only a big scale business but also 
a complex one. Drahozal261 argues in his paper that specialized arbitration (that he calls ‘trade 
association arbitration’) is mostly dealing with simple cases. For example, diamond industry 
does not have complex cases because they only need “customs and usages”262 in order to solve 
disputes. Drahozal links the simplicity of the products to the self-enforcement doctrine and 
makes it a pre-condition to the implementation of the doctrine.263 ICA is indeed complex 
especially in cases of construction projects or in the energy sector. This complexity “affects the 
difficulty of verifying performance under the contract and the degree of contract 
standardization”.264 It seems that complexity constitutes another impediment to the 
implementation of the self-enforcement doctrine. 
 
4.2.3.3 Advantages of State courts 
The third challenge is not much an impediment due to the features of ICA but rather an inherent 
advantage of State courts. They are constitutive of the judicial branch which is responsible for 
controlling the respect of the law and for that purpose, they retain police powers to investigate 
properly or force parties to comply with their ruling. This power of the State is inaccessible for 
private entities. No private entities are able to legally force parties to comply with an award and 
                                                 
261 Ibidem. 
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263 “Parties dealing with simpler products are likely to have more routine, repeat transactions and smaller amounts 
at stake in those transactions. Such parties will be better able to organize into trade associations and to use 
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in case of a mala fides award-debtors, police powers are needed. It means that the State is 
always needed in extreme cases. Economic sanctions and private enforcement works when all 
the members of the system are rational but it is no news that human beings are far from being 
rational.265 
To conclude with, the self-enforcement system has little chance to achieve its goal in ICA 
because of its complexity and scale. However, small initiatives can be made in different sectors 
and that could work but the reliance on the State courts would continue and the ‘dream’266 
seems to get impossible to achieve in practice. However, empirical evidences are contradictory 
because they tend to undermine the problem of lack of autonomy for both public policy and 
enforcement. 
 
4.3 Theoretical problems insignificant in practice 
Based on empirical research, this section is trying to argue for an insignificance of these 
theoretical problems because of their little representativeness of the real practice of the business 
community. The general argument appears as supporting the possibility of an autonomous 
theory of arbitration even though some problems are present in it.  
Garcia admits it already in his study of public policy, “public policy seems to be more important 
in theory rather than in the practice of ICA. Only in very limited cases has the exception been 
applied by the national courts of the countries who are members to the NYC”267. It is the same 
for the enforcement problem, it is a false problem only based on theoretical possibilities which 
rarely occurs. For this study, two surveys are going to be taken as examples, the Study268 of 
Naimark and Keer (called “Study” hereinafter), and also the Survey269 made by PWC and the 
School of International Arbitration (called “PWC Survey” hereinafter).  
The Study made by Naimark and Keer is quite a slow-scale survey compared to the PWC 
Survey but it is still “representative of worldwide international business arbitrations” according 
to the authors.270 According to the Study, it is clear that there is a high number of fully complied 
awards – the article establishes 61 out of 100 cases where the compliance was voluntary and 
                                                 
265 The problem can be also the end-game problem in case of expulsion of the trade association in specialized 
arbitration, see Bernstein, L. (2009). 
266 Lew, J. D. M. (2006) 
267 Garcia, E.J. (1990) 
268 Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Post-award experience in international commercial arbitration in 
Drahozal, C. R., & Naimark, R. W. (2005). 
269 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP., & School of International Arbitration (Queen Mary, University of London). 
(2008). 
270 Drahozal, C. R. & Naimark, R. W. (2005). p.274 
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only 12 cases were enforced by Court. Indeed, these numbers are different from the PWC Study 
but there is still a preponderance of voluntary compliance or of negotiation (26 out of 100). The 
most interesting part of the Study is found in the reasons invoked for the 35 cases of non-
compliance. Among these 35 cases of non-compliance, there are 14 cases of bankruptcies and 
6 cases of “lack of practical court enforcement/jurisdiction, either for accessible assets to attach 
or because of relative inaccessibility of a foreign jurisdiction”.271 The real problem seems not 
to be enforcement and public policy issues because in 61% of cases, the awards are fully and 
voluntarily complied. The remaining 39% of non-compliance cases are mostly due to external 
reasons such as bankruptcies. In a case of bankruptcy, all the techniques to enforce the award 
would be a failure.  
 
Concerning the PWC Survey, “84% of the participating corporate counsel indicated that, in 
more than 76% of their arbitration proceedings, the non-prevailing party voluntarily complies 
with the arbitral award; in most cases, according to the interviews, compliance reaches 90%”.272 
This figure of 90% is much bigger than the previous study. This survey notes a sole 3% of non-
compliance. Indeed, Brekoulakis’ analysis of the PWC study gives more information about the 
insurance and re-insurance companies which have a 100% full compliance level.273 The PWC 
study indicates that “the principal reason given for compliance with the arbitral awards was to 
preserve a business relationship. The highest level of compliance appears in the re-insurance, 
pharmaceuticals, shipping, aeronautics and oil and gas sectors.”274 
 
More than these raw figures, there is a constant in these studies: an increasing number of 
voluntarily complied with awards which makes all the problem of public policy and 
enforcement irrelevant. Indeed, if the parties are bona fides and comply with the award, either 
by negotiation or directly, there are no such problems and the evoked ones are solely theoretical. 
Concerning the autonomous theory of arbitration, it appears that if public policy and 
enforcement are indeed irrelevant, the theory is still possible. That is what is going to be studied 
in the following chapter.   
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5 Actual development and realism 
This last chapter is dedicated to a theoretical recap about the actual place of the autonomous 
theory of arbitration in the legal field. Autonomous theory looks like an utopia about to replace 
a previous another utopia. However, the question arising out of the establishment of the 
autonomous theory of arbitration is its desirability. This desirability will be assessed regarding 
different evolutions of the world order and minor roles that States are getting compared to 
private entities which are becoming much more important. Once the current paradigm is 
analyzed, the possibility to bring the new paradigm will be studied. The question of how this 
theory could be applied will be the interrogation of the last section. 
  
5.1 Autonomous theory as an utopia 
The autonomous theory is an utopia, a dream, a fantasy of arbitration practitioners. However, 
these denominations are not negative in themselves, they just show that legal theory needs a 
fiction in its ground in order to survive. However, the autonomous theory is the dream of a 
certain category of ideology: neo-liberalism and proponents of self-regulated private powers.  
 
5.1.1 State positivism v. Legal pluralism 
Since the Westphalian Treaties, legal theory is based on State positivism. It means that the only 
source of power is the State or community of States. This Westphalian approach is strict on the 
sources of law and does equate “law with state law”.275 The Thirty Years War that the Treaties 
ended had been caused by legal pluralism that existed before.276  
The most prominent figure representing State positivism since the Treaties is Kelsen and his 
Gründnorm theory. For Kelsen, the only possible way to achieve justice is through law made 
by the State.277 This dictatorship of State positivism forbidding all other legal systems in a 
territory278 was justified at the time of the climax of the State power and sovereignty. The 
Westphalian Treaties formalized State positivism which was already discussed among the 
intellectuals of that time. Jean Bodin and Hobbes were the strongest proponents of sovereign 
States which would not tolerate any parallel legal systems in their territory. Before the 
Westphalian Treaties, France had a period going towards the Absolute Monarchy with different 
intellectuals as Bodin, Loiseau or Domat which were feverous proponents of an absolute 
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monarchy with an exclusive and supreme sovereignty.279 However, this exact definition of 
sovereignty was expanded to the definition of a legal system considered then as comprehensive, 
exclusive and supreme.280 These were State positivists criteria to consider social norms as law. 
It refers directly to State law because State positivists could not think of law outside of the 
State.  
However, this paradigm of State positivism is about to falter because of the crisis of the State 
and its power regarding the level of cross-border exchanges and the incapacity or unwillingness 
of States to regulate these parts of trade. It is certain that the paradigm is still State positivism 
because every new theory – candidates for paradigm – are referring to State positivism to show 
how this latter is inadequate to the current context. Moreover, the new theories have not yet 
arrived in the handbooks of law and constitute rather the margins rather than its centre for now. 
One of the new competing theories is legal pluralism which embodies the autonomous theory 
of arbitration. In this general theory, legal systems are multiple and can be superposed and the 
concept of “no one can serve two masters”281 would not work because in some matters, other 
legal systems could be used. This open paradigm would allow coexistence and consideration 
of specific social norms that were undermined until now. One of the main element of this new 
theory is also the fact that other legal systems would be living without the need of the State as 
the autonomous theory of arbitration. Though, this new theory is labelled as utopia or fantasy.282 
 
Especially when coming from a State positivist point of view, the autonomist, pluralist, and 
transnational views seem utopian and impossible to achieve. It would be “governance without 
government”.283 Ralf Michaels studied the literature of autonomous theory and remarked that 
this utopian character was not only a criticism but rather a label that the proponents have used 
themselves.284 This label can be considered realistic because of the paradigm shift that it 
constitutes from state positivism. However, Ralf Michaels adds that State positivism is also 
based on an utopia. He emphasizes that “normative bindingness of positive law rests on the 
                                                 
279 Jean Bodin explains its vision of sovereignty in these two quotes : « La souveraineté est la puissance absolue 
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socially observable fact that people in fact recognize the rulemaking power of the sovereign.”285 
Michaels reminds his readers that State and also sovereignty are not real concepts but rather 
existing due to “our mutual faith in it”.286 This is the same with the transnational view, it is 
thought to be a virtuous new paradigm but it is an utopia. However, it would still work as the 
utopian State positivism has worked because people believed in it. In this regard, the utopian 
character of the autonomous theory is not a handicap but rather an element to trust more in its 
possibility.  
 
5.1.2 Origins of the dream  
This dream or utopia is originating from two elements: the medieval period nostalgia and neo-
liberal myths.  
Not even entering the debate of knowing whether there was a unified law in medieval period, 
it is sure there was legal pluralism and something that went beyond frontiers. The less 
controversial transnational law was Church law which was the same in whole Europe because 
the head was in Rome and not inside national frontiers. This was not only religious moral but 
rather a well-constructed law with all the features belonging to a legal order. The other 
transnational law is the law merchant but as said in the beginning of this study, this existence 
of transnational law merchant is subject to debate in the legal scholarship even though historical 
scholarship is agreeing on a fragmented reality which includes an important part of autonomous 
legislation. However, this medieval past which was a time when different legal systems were 
surviving side by side without anyone reigning supreme over others is deleted by modern 
Westphalianism. The State tried to declare its supremacy for the sole reason of having the 
territory which made him entitle to control whatever happen in this territory. This territorial 
understanding of legality has not been challenged until the middle of the 20th century with the 
appearance of transnational law theories. These theories are trying to show state positivism is 
not the only possible way of seeing legality and that other understandings have prevailed in 
history. This nostalgia can be felt by groups which conceive non-state law as “liberating social 
groups from the oppression of the State”.287 
 
The other element at the origin of the autonomous theory of arbitration is the neo-liberal 
discourse which appeared in the 80s in the political realm with the election of Ronald Reagan 
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in the United States, and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Neoliberalism emphasizes 
autonomous arbitration privately guided as being “natural, neutral, consensual, [and of] 
efficient nature of private exchange relations”.288 Cutler insists on the “art of separation”289 
operated by neo-liberals in order to make understand that law and economy are two different 
elements and that economy is not supposed to be political. Then, self-regulation would not be 
considered as political but rather a correct management of business disputes.290 This lack of 
political matters in economy theoretically allows for the possibility to move to an autonomous 
theory of arbitration because this move could be justified by criteria of neutrality and efficiency.  
In this regard, a mixture of medieval nostalgia and neo-liberal concepts, transnational law 
appears as a myth capable to replace the myth of State positivism and operate a paradigm shift.  
 
5.2 Desirability of an autonomous theory 
An autonomous theory is a myth which could be implemented. Should it be? The question is 
about the desirability of having an autonomous ICA refers to the adequacy between the needs 
of the current system and propositions offered by the autonomous theory. The crisis of State 
positivism can be resolved only with a paradigm shift embodying responses to challenges that 
made State positivism outdated. The overall point of view supported in this section is the 
unsustainability of a situation in which the current paradigm does not explain the new 
developments of law, leading to an urgent, new, and more open-minded theory. 
 
5.2.1 End of the State 
First of all, the level of the State is outdated and does not correspond anymore to the needs and 
expectations of the contemporary world. Since 1648, there has been this paradigm of State 
positivism where the State was the exclusive legislator either alone for its internal affairs or 
with other states for international affairs. Private entities were forbidden to openly intervene 
because economy did not belong to the realm of the political and that is why there has been a 
gap between theory and the actual practice because they intervened in the political arena 
through their self-regulation. This State positivist theory is what is still taught in Public 
International Law while private powers are mostly ignored. However, there is more than one 
element making a new theory desirable.  
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The first element that can be considered as a plea for a new paradigm is the incapacity of the 
State to deal with globalization. Indeed, globalization means that the basis of State positivism, 
the territory, is made irrelevant. International trade is less and less dealt within national borders 
because of their inadequacy. Apart from it, the State lacks also interests in regulation of such 
matters. In sum, there is a lack of interest from both sides: The State does not have any benefits 
from trying to deal with international trade matters because these are external elements and the 
net benefit to the territory of that State can be zero. International trade, at the same time, 
perceive national courts as parochial and tend, more and more, to prefer international 
arbitration.291 Moreover, adversarial disputes are not beneficial for businesses and arbitration 
seems to be the lesser evil compared to dispute in court.292 So, the level of State is easily avoided 
and it no longer corresponds to the needs of the current functioning of economy. Globalization 
pushes States to their paroxysm and it seems that State positivism has already surrendered. 
Model Laws, Institutional Arbitration Rules and all these privately-made laws are regulating 
most of the arbitration proceedings. This ‘end of the State’ or at least of State positivism calls 
for a new understanding of law which would consider private entities and their already-existing 
regulatory powers.293 
 
Secondly, the impact of postmodernism on legal theory will be studied with an eye on State 
positivism and legal pluralism. Starting in philosophy and art, postmodernism has also 
influenced legal theory. It can be said that the whole movement of legal plurality and proponents 
of the autonomy of arbitration are deeply influenced by postmodern thinking. Postmodernism 
is characterized mostly by an irreverence, a doubt on the truth which gives way to a total 
relativism. These characteristics can be found applied to law by Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
which defines legal pluralism as a “key concept in a post-modern view of law”.294 However, 
his legal pluralism is different because “the different legal orders are conceived as separate 
entities coexisting in the same political space, but rather the conception of different legal spaces 
superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as much as in our actions”.295 To the 
argument of exclusiveness of State positivists, Santos answers with the fact that people’s life is 
“constituted by an intersection of different legal orders, that is, by interlegality”.296 This kind 
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of vision paves the way to the end of the State positivism and the start of the possible legal 
pluralism which would include an autonomous arbitral legal order. 
 
Thirdly, Cutler’s assessment of the current situation sees the end of the State because of the 
“disjunction [that exist] between theory and practice”.297 Cutler talks about this disjunction as 
causing a possible “crisis of legitimacy”.298 This disjunction is between the theoretical role of 
States in international law and their actual practice. The difference is a big gap because in 
practice, non-State entities are powerful and they are creating the real content of private 
international law while States are recognized as the architects of international law without 
having any clue of its building because of their territorial limits. Indeed, private entities are not 
considered as politically relevant and it makes these latter invisible in legal theory.299 As Cutler 
held, “The corporation is undertheorized, while the state is overtheorized”.300 One of the 
reasons for this disjunction is State positivism301 which pressed for an ultra-focus on States 
because only they can enact laws. However, the practice shows that social norms of private 
entities became similar to law while the focus was on the State in the international arena. This 
rise of private powers is going to be the topic of the next part.  
 
5.2.2 Private powers 
While the State is decreasing its relevance in international relations, private entities are taking 
it on the fields in which States have no interest neither capacity to regulate. This are the non-
regulated parts which needs to be regulated anyway. As the old saying goes “ubi societas ibi 
jus”, there is no society or community without law. For that reasons, when public institutions 
do not have any incentives to regulate, private powers have some room to regulate. These 
residual non-regulated parts are created either by lack of incentives by nation-States or by lack 
of jurisdiction to cover global issues. For example, international commercial arbitration is not 
regulated as a result of a lack of jurisdiction and that is why party autonomy is authorized and 
private arbitration institutions are growing all over the world.  
 
Private regulatory powers cannot really be compared to State law because they lack formal 
recognition as law. Since it is private, these norms are not called law but rather rules or 
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recommendations – it is the domain of soft law. The power of soft law lies in the authority of 
the drafters of this soft law. For example, the International Bar Association (hereinafter ‘IBA’) 
issued IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration. This rule issued by a 
private association met the demands of such regulation and the standing of the IBA allowed 
this soft law to be highly complied in ICA. Regarding other points in ICA302, there is not much 
regulations made by States but rather some soft laws which naturally dominate the regulatory 
domain in this area. As international trade is growing fast, soft law is much more appropriate 
for business-oriented decisions because it allows for flexibility and infringement. Cutler writes 
in her book that the “enhanced significance of soft law, informal, discretionary, ad hoc, and 
private legal regulation is quite inconsistent with and, perhaps, even eroding the foundation of 
the rule of law as a system of global governance”.303 The growth of private ordering is harming 
public regulations and emphasizing the defaults of the latter. State law is not flexible neither 
open to negotiation, but rather expensive and time-consuming.304 
This growth of private powers in practice is not theorized sufficiently. It constitutes a 
disjunction already studied above. Theory is not recognizing this power that private powers got 
in practice. This non-recognition harms the values calling for a democratic control because they 
have power without any constraints. Cutler’s argument is about giving balance between 
responsibility and power. On her book, she denounces a disjunction between these two elements 
and argues that private powers are regulated out of the democratic control. This element of the 
lack of democratic control has been studied above.305 This important power that private entities 
retains without being subject to any constraints is also calling for a new paradigm which would 
recognize these private powers and ascertain a weighted responsibility. Indeed, a legal system 
once recognized always has its own limits.306 
 
To finish with, the desirability of the autonomous theory is clear – State positivism cannot stand 
anymore and the need of a new open-minded paradigm appears. This would be a paradigm 
embodying the values of pluralism in legal theory and would entail the arbitral legal order. 
However, the last question which can be asked now is about the possibility and the conditions 
of possibility of such a theory.  
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5.3 Possibility of an autonomous theory 
The utopian autonomous theory of arbitration is desirable. It corresponds to the needs of legal 
theory which no longer recognizes State positivism as its explanatory paradigm. Instantly, the 
question relates to the possibility of such a theory and the conditions for that. In this regard, the 
State must be the last-resort choice while, at the same time, the concept of self-regulation must 
be one of the conditions for its success.  
 
5.3.1 Self-regulation: condition of a success 
It is complicated to see the possibility of a self-regulated system. This difficulty was explained 
by Hayek and its theory on spontaneous order, also known as kosmos. This order is spontaneous 
– it is the result “de l’action humaine mais non d’un dessein humain”.307 However, Hayek 
acknowledges the complexity of conceptualizing a spontaneous order which would function as 
a natural order just because of its own virtue. Hayek would speak about the kosmos of the 
market in a competitive situation. For this thesis, the spontaneous order could be the 
autonomous arbitration which would order itself spontaneously. This comparison with Hayek’s 
kosmos is relevant in the extent that the idea of an autonomous arbitral legal order raises doubts 
on its capacity to exercise his functions in probity and not only in the interests of multinational 
corporations, as some would argue.308 However, if the arbitral legal order can be compared to 
a spontaneous order, there will be no problem because each spontaneous order requires a 
juridical framework in order to work properly.309 
 
What looks like as a chaos in State positivist’s point of view is rather an ordered anarchy. The 
competitive market that Hayek has theorized as the spontaneous order is not freed from 
legislation. On the contrary, Hayek recognizes the need for laws to organize the market in order 
to prevent the failures. Indeed, without the imposition of certain rules, the very existence of the 
market is at risk. In Hayek’s competitive market, the monopoly of multinational corporations 
is the risk that he evokes. In the case of the arbitral legal order, the problem is similar because 
multinational corporations could transform the whole system to avoid the most basic rules of 
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law. In this regard, the Hayekian solution is that there is a need of “an intelligently designed 
and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other. Even the most essential 
prerequisite of its proper functioning, the prevention of fraud and deception (including 
exploitation of ignorance) provides a great and by no means yet fully accomplished object of 
legislative activity.”310 In this sentence, Hayek recognizes both the needs for a public policy 
which would stop the fraudulent acts of market players and a need for an ‘intelligently designed’ 
law. Concerning Hayek’s perspective, he sees the market in the national term and for that 
reason, transnational concerns are not really included in his analysis. However, from the 
transnational perspective, this ‘adjusted legal framework’ may be non-state law but rather self-
regulation. The only element that Hayek does not wish to have is a planning legislation from 
the State. So, it can be argued that Hayek would not have refused the idea of a self-regulatory 
system because it constitutes laws limiting the system. 
In the matter of this thesis, it brings a theoretical possibility of an autonomous arbitration which 
would work as a spontaneous order with its own limitations. The rule of law must be established 
in the Hayekian market311 and in that way, it differs from liberalism which was the sole laissez-
faire. Hayek insists, on the contrary, in the legal framework. This self-regulation would work 
through reputation-based systems and also through the empowerment of arbitrators, who would 
have to think themselves as not only chosen by parties but rather members of an autonomous 
legal order that they help to sustain with each of their decisions. Moreover, what have been said 
in the previous chapter was that public policy issues would be considered in the transnational 
level and if needed, State Courts could intervene to stop free-riders.  
 
5.3.2 State: last resort  
If autonomous arbitration is to be considered already achieved in its majority, there is one 
element that must be noted on the conditions of its actual application. Paulsson’s view would 
prevail over Gaillard’s because the actual system would not be totally free from the State. It has 
been seen that this total freedom was possible in practice but less in theory. For that reason, the 
autonomous ICA would work “routinely without judicial assistance”312 but it is impossible to 
do without the State assistance in the theoretical functioning of international arbitration.   
The State is to be the last resort. As the paradigm has not changed yet, it is not possible to think 
beyond the State and its police powers which are quite convincing when the topic is 
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enforcement or public policy. There are still some private alternatives for every matter as self-
enforcement and consideration of transnational public policy by arbitrators but the State 




























Page 77 of 77 
 
6 Conclusion 
The dream of Julian D.M. Lew313 of a pure autonomous ICA is not possible. At least, it is not 
possible to consider such a theory applied in its entirety in the real world. So, the real question 
that scholars must respond to is not about the sole possibility of an autonomous ICA but rather 
about conditions of the implementation of an autonomous system for ICA. The question is then 
not about the presence or the absence of the State but rather about the level and quality of its 
presence. 
 
State interference is not always a problem. On the contrary, when State power is used in a 
virtuous manner, it could increase the overall quality of arbitration proceedings. Cases of non-
compliance and abuse of the ICA system illustrate benefits that State intervention can bring. 
This type of interference is beneficial when framed carefully. Indeed, the role of the State must 
be framed as precisely as possible when dealing with ICA - businesses must not get afraid of 
the downsides of the State power. As said by Cutler, the State acts in cases of unnatural 
activities314 and it must be the case for ICA as well. It means that the State’s role must be framed 
in a way to allow only interventions when there are abuses of the system. Then, the State is 
needed and suitable because he does retain police powers and the sense of justice. This role 
could be considered as undermining the autonomous ICA but, on the contrary, it largely restores 
its legitimacy in regard of the legal theory. Indeed, it brings limits to a private system, limits 
that even F. Hayek did not oppose. 
 
The State is present in the prospective autonomous ICA but his power is not triggered as a daily 
routine.315 His role is rare and cannot amount to be a part of the basic features of the autonomous 
system of ICA. The State is then considered as the lesser evil that allows legitimacy and fluidity 
in the functioning of ICA. The substantial limits to State interference were presented as 
transnational public policy and self-enforcement. These elements are going to limit the scope 
of interference of State power in ICA. 
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